Casenotes and Statute Notes by Monts, Britt D. et al.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 49 | Issue 3 Article 5
1984




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Britt D. Monts et al., Casenotes and Statute Notes, 49 J. Air L. & Com. 623 (1984)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol49/iss3/5
Casenotes and Statute Notes
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT-RECORDATION OF AIRCRAFT
CONVEYANCES-Transfers of Aircraft Interests Must Be Evi-
denced by Writings, and Such Instruments Must Be Re-
corded with the Federal Aviation Administration before
Innocent Third Parties Can Be Affected. Philko Aviation, Inc.
v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983).
On April 19, 1978, Maurice Shacket and his wife
purchased a new Piper Navajo aircraft from Roger Smith
Aircraft Sales, Inc.1 At the closing, which took place at an
airport in Illinois,2 the Shackets tendered full payment3 and
took possession of the airplane.' Citing clerical difficulties,
Roger Smith did not deliver the title documents at the clos-
ing5 but assured the Shackets that he "would take care of the
paperwork."6 No effort was made by either party to record
the sale with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in
Oklahoma City. 7
I Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2477 (1983). Maurice Shacket is
a private pilot and has owned aircraft for many years . Shacket v. Philko Aviation,
Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1982). Roger Smith ran the business of Smith Aircraft
Sales, Inc. and served as president of the corporation. Id. at 509.
2 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
IdM. The Shackets had earlier made a cash downpayment and relinquished posses-
sion of another airplane, which was allowed as a trade-in. Shacket v. Philko Aviation,
Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1982). At the closing, Mr. Shacket paid the balance
due on the purchase price. Id
4 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
.Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1982). Smith did give
the Shackets photocopies of bills of sale from previous transfers of the aircraft to show
proper chain of title. Id.
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
Id. The Shackets testified that they thought Roger Smith would record the bill of
sale as part of the "paperwork." Id. Conveyances of aircraft interests must be recorded
with the FAA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma before third parties are put on constuctive
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Several days later Mr. Smith fraudulently negotiated a sale
of the same aircraft to Philko Aviation, Inc. (Philko).8 Tell-
ing Philko that the airplane was being fitted with new avion-
ics in Michigan,9 Mr. Smith transferred the title documents
to Philko t° and accepted payment.1 Philko had checked the
title against FAA records prior to the sale and had found no
previous recordation.' 2 The bill of sale was promptly re-
corded with the FAA.' 3 Philko, however, never received pos-
session of the aircraft.
14
After learning of the sham sale to Philko, the Shackets
commenced an action for declaratory relief in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to fix
their right of ownership in the airplane.' 5 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judg-
ment in favor of the Shackets after concluding that federal
recordation requirements did not preempt substantive state
law concerning title transfers.' 6 The court held that under
Illinois law, Roger Smith had no interest in the aircraft at the
notice that ownership transfers have occurred. See infra note 13, and accompanying
text; text accompanying notes 19-24.
" Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477. The transaction was not a
typical sale. Id. Philco owned the buildings and property on which Smith Aircraft was
located. Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1982). Prior to
the sale to the Shackets, Philko had leased the property and operations located
thereon to Smith Aircraft. Id Pursuant to the lease, Philko partially guaranteed Smith
Aircraft's line of credit and loaned Smith Aircraft $80,000. Id. Roger Smith, the owner
of Smith Aircraft, approached Philko and told its president that he had arranged to
sell the aircraft, which he had previously sold to the Shackets, to a California corpora-
tion, but that the bank would not loan him enough money to buy the aircraft from the
Piper distributor. Id Philko then loaned Smith Aircraft the needed money and took
title to the Piper Navajo as security. Id Proceeds of the sale were supposed to be ap-
plied to the balance of Smith Aircraft's loan from Philko. Id
I Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
lo Id. at 2478. Roger Smith gave Philko the bill of sale that he fraudulently with-
held from the Shackets. Id.
Id at 2477-78. Philko borrowed funds for the purchase from its bank. Id.
Id at 2478 n.l.
Id at 2478. An instrument of conveyance must be filed with the FAA in
Oklahoma City before third parties can be deemed to have constructive notice of a
transfer. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). FAA Aircraft Registry, 14 C.F.R. § 47.19 (1983).
See zfra text accompanying notes 19-24
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2478.
Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
' Shacket v. Philko, 681 F.2d. 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
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time of the sale to Philko, and as a result, Philko did not ac-
quire good title.'7 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the question of federal preemption of state law.'8
Held, reversed and remanded- Transfers of Aircraft Interests Must
Be Evidenced by Writings, and Such Instruments Must Be
Recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration before
Innocent Third Parties Can Be Affected. Phdko Aviation, Inc.
v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983).
I. RECORDATION UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
Congress in 1958 established a nationwide system for re-
cording certain documents affecting titles or interests in air-
craft.' 9 Section 503 of the Federal Aviation Act (Act)
requires the recording of "any conveyance which affects the
title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of the United
States.''20  The Act additionally covers leases and security
agreements affecting large aircraft engines2' and certain
other aircraft parts.2 The purpose of section 503, as stated
by one court, is to "protect persons who have dealt on the
faith of recorded title."' 23 Once a filing is made, third parties
are put on constructive notice that an aircraft is owned or
encumbered by the recording party. 4 It is undisputed that
Congress intended the filing system to be the only system of
0 Id at 512. The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-403(1), which provides in relevant part
that "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer." Id
m Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 487 (1982). The Court granted certio-
rari only on the question of whether federal recordation requirements for aircraft
transfers preempted state laws that permit aircraft transfers by possession alone. Id See
also 51 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1982) (No. 82-342).
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 503, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 772-74,
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976)). Originally, conveyances were required to be
recorded under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which was later repealed and re-
placed by the Act of 1958. Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, 1005 (1938), repealed by,
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1401(b), Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 806.
S See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). Cf. Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 408 F.
Supp. 24, 33 (E.D. Penn. 1976) (holding that FAA recording provisions do not cover
leases of aircraft).
2, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(2).
2 Id § 1403(a)(3).
23 C.I.M. Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1980).
2. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
1984]
626 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
its kind in the country.2 5 Consequently, state recording sys-
tems are preempted by section 503.26
The term "validity" as used in section 503 is a source of
confusion.27 Section 503(c) states that "[n]o conveyance or
instrument the recording of which is provided for by subsec-
tion (a) . . .shall be valid. . . against any person other than
the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is
made or given . . . , until such conveyance is filed for recor-
dation. "28 However, an unrecorded interest is valid against a
third party with actual notice of its existence.29  One com-
mentator has interpreted this language to mean that filing
does not guarantee enforceability of an interest, but simply
allows a claimant the chance of enforceability. °
Congress has specifically deferred to state law certain de-
terminations concerning aircraft titles and interests.31  En-
acted in 1964 to clarify the scope of section 503, section 506
provides as follows: "The validity of any instrument the re-
2. See Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder. Interests in Aircraft Under Our Federal System, 46 S.
CAL. L. REv. 316 (1973). The author compares the Federal Aviation Act's recording
systems to very similar systems established under the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 921-27 (1976) and the Federal Motor Vehicle Lien Act, 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1976),
repealedby Act of Oct. 17, 1978 § 4(b), Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337, 1466-70, and
concludes "[t]hat [the view that the] filing system is exclusive is the only sensible read-
ing of the statute." Sigman, supra, at 319 n.15.
26 Id. See, e.g., Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086, 1088 (3d Cir.
1978) (holding that there has been federal preemption only to the limited extent that
Congress has sensibly federalized choice of law); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Dist.
Co., 284 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (finding that federal law governs the
rights of claimants to aircraft interests to the extent that such rights are dependent
upon the fact and time of recordation); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp.
599, 603 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (holding that the right of Congress to make interests in
aircraft dependent upon fact or time of recordation is not questioned). Under the
preemption doctrine when a federal law conflicts with a state law, the latter must yield
to the former under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a good
discussion of this doctrine, see Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 102 S. Ct.
3014, 3022 (1982).
27 The Federal Aviation Act does not define the term. Moreover, section 1406 also
uses the term in describing the areas where state substantive laws continue to apply.
See Sigman, supra note 25, at 323.
7a 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976).
29 Id.
- Scott, Liens in Aircraft." 1iorities, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 193, 203 (1958) ("Recorda-
tion itself merely validates; it does not grant priority.") The Supreme Court expressly
approved this view in Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1983).
, See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
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cording of which is provided for by section 1403 . . .shall be
governed by the laws of the State . . in which such instru-
ment is delivered. '32 The reasons for this section are twofold.
First, it preserves state laws concerning the underlying valid-
ity of instruments, 33 and second, it prevents forum shop-
ping.3 4 Section 506, like section 503, uses the term "validity"
without defining it.3 5 Reading the two sections together, in-
struments subject to the Federal Aviation Act must be re-
corded before they are valid against third parties without
notice, but an instrument's underlying validity is to be deter-
mined under state law.36
The Act is also ambiguous in defining the types of convey-
ances and instruments that are subject to federal recordation
under section 503.37 Courts have wrestled with this question
on numerous occasions .3  Generally, instruments evidencing
sales, security interests and other contractual liens must be
recorded.39 With respect to constitutional and statutory liens
112 Id.
33 S. REP. No. 1060, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2319, 2320 ("[T]o determine the validity of... an instrument, one need
only to look to the substantive law of the particular State in which the instrument was
delivered"). For a discussion of the legislative history of section 506, see Sanders v.
M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086, 1088 (3d Cir. 1978).
Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft, 575 F.2d 1086, 1088 (3d Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit
concluded that state law is displaced by the Act only so far as choice of law is con-
cerned in order to prevent forum shopping in aircraft financing that might arise under
the holding of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Id Undesirable
results would occur if competing interest holders in aircraft were able to choose among
numerous forums without any limitations. Parties, by contract or otherwise, could in-
voke the laws of a state that would likely provide a favorable judicial outcome regard-
less of that forum's connection with the transaction.
' See supra notes 26, 28.
:6 See supra note 28. See also 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403(c), 1406 (1976); United States Avia-
tion Underwriters, Inc. v. WTAE Flying Club, 300 F. Supp. 341, 346-47 (W.D. Penn.
1969) (question of whether lender had a proper chattel mortgage was a pure question
of state law).
11 Section 503 requires the recording of conveyances, leases, mortgages, conditional
sales and other "instruments executed for security purposes." 49 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2)
(1976). A "conveyance" is defined in the Act as "a bill of sale, contract of conditional
sale, mortgage, assignment of mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or inter-
est in, property." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(20) (Supp. V 1981).
-" See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1270, 1279 (1968 & Supp. 1981). For a discus-
sion of the effects of recordation on various forms of aircraft financing, see Eyer, The
Sale and Financrng of Aircraft, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 217 (1979).
31 See Sigman, supra note 25, at 322 n.27. A mechanic's lien is defined as a "claim
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(e.g., mechanic's liens and other possessory liens) the courts
have disagreed over whether these liens must be recorded
under section 503 before third parties are put on constructive
notice.4 °
Filing requirements under section 503 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act differ from standard filing requirements under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Forty-nine states have
adopted article 9 of the UCC, which covers secured transac-
tions involving personal property.4' UCC section 9-203 gen-
erally requires that secured parties evidence their interests in
collateral by executing written security agreements.42 Once
this writing requirement is satisfied, a party must file a stan-
dardized notice form, known as a financing statement, in the
state where the collateral is located or where the debtor re-
sides.43 Filing of a financing statement perfects a security in-
terest by giving third parties constructive notice of its
created by statutes for the purpose of securing priority of payment for the price or
value of work performed and materials furnished." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). "A lien is possessory where the creditor has the right to hold posses-
sion of the specific property until satisfaction of the debt or performance of an obliga-
tion." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY at 1049.
- See Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank, 139 Ill. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d
446, 449 (1966) (mechanic's lien must be filed with FAA). But see Holiday Airlines v.
World Airways (In re Holiday Airlines), 647 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981) (unrecorded
consensual possessory lien for repair and maintenance upheld under California law);
Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Commerce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974)
(unrecorded mechanic's lien given priority over prior recorded security interest under
Florida law); see also infra notes 73, 119; Sigman, supra note 25, at 322 nn.25, 26.
11 U.C.C. art. 9 commentary at 5, 6 (1981). Only Louisiana has not adopted article
9. Id.
42 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-203 (1981). The writing requirement is not express but is
implied from the requirements that a security agreement describe the collateral ade-
quately and be signed by the debtor. A writing is not required if the creditor retains
possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1981). Additionally, a security interest
must be supported by consideration, and the debtor must have "rights in the collat-
eral." U.C.C. § 9-305 (1981). For an exhaustive analysis of security interests under
article 9 of the U.C.C., see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
901 (1980).
43 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-402 (1981). Financing statements are barebones documents
that provide third parties with notice that an item of personal property is encumbered
in some way and by whom. Id. Section 9-401 contains several alternative versions
regarding where financing statements are to be filed, from which states may pick and
choose in adopting their respective versions of the UCC. Generally, financing state-
ments are filed with the secretary of state of the state where the collateral is located or
where the debtor resides. U.C.C. § 9-103 (1981).
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existence." As mentioned above, recordation under the
UCC, as well as under state recording statutes for aircraft ti-
tles, is preempted by section 503 of the Federal Aviation
Act. 5 Under section 503, an interest holder in an aircraft
must file the actual instrument of conveyance rather than a
notice form.46 The term "conveyance" as used in the Act is
defined as "a bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, mort-
gage, assignment of mortgage, or any other instrument affect-
ing title to, or interest in, property. ' 47 In all likelihood, the
drafters envisioned that a writing would be executed in every
aircraft conveyance, and indeed, this is the usual practice. 48
The FAA recordation system provides a convenient and in-
expensive clearinghouse that enables owners, prospective pur-
chasers and financers of aircraft to check for preexisting
contractual liens and to verify ownership.4 9 The scope of the
Act is clearly intended to preempt state recordation systems.5 °
Legislative history, however, suggests that questions of sub-
stantive validity are to be deferred to the states.5 Yet the
statutory scheme is not without its uncertainties. 2 Courts
have been continually confronted with questions regarding
the extent to which section 503 preempts state law53 and the
types of instruments that must be recorded with the FAA.54
4 U.C.C. § 9-401 (1981). A person can contact the secretary of state of a particular
state by phone or by mail and easily find out whether a piece of personal property has
any perfected liens on it.
• See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
See supra notes 20, 27 and accompanying text.
17 See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(20) (Supp. V 1981). See also supra note 37.
I A dissenting opinion in American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Ins. Managers, Inc.,
244 Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 544, 548 (1968) states that "an essential element in the Con-
gressional scheme [of section 503] is that the conveyance or other instrument be in
writing, so that it can be recorded."
19 The federal recordation system is maintained in Oklahoma City. FAA Aircraft
Registry, 14 C.F.R. § 47.19 (1983). The cost to record an instrument with the FAA is
approximately $10.00.
- See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
r" See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
' See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-52; infra text accompanying notes 54-140.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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II. DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE RECORDING
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
Both state and federal courts agree55 that section 503 estab-
lishes the exclusive filing system for aircraft interests.56 A
more difficult question is whether Congress also intended for
section 503 to preempt state laws recognizing unrecorded air-
craft transfers and other state laws assigning priorities among
various recorded interest holders.-7 Here the courts have
split. 58
One of the earliest cases involving section 503 is In re Veter-
ans' Air Express Co. 59  In Veterans' Air Express, the United
States sold two airplanes to an individual and retained secur-
ity interests in each plane, both of which were recorded with
rir, See, e.g., Sanders v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086, 1088 (3d Cir. 1978);
Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 296 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1961);
Cessna Fin. Co. v. Skyways Enter. Inc., 580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979).
"' See supra note 25.
" See State Securites Co. v. Aviation Enter. Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966)
(holding that validity of a conveyance is a state law determination); Texas Nat'l Bank
of Houston v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (holding that validity of
a conveyance must first be determined under state law); Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin.
Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d 655 (1967) (establishing validity of
title under state law as the initial inquiry where competing interests are involved);
Bank of Henderson v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1977) (priorities are decided under state law). Compare Pope v. National Aero Fin.
Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965) (holding that federal recordation
totally preempts state law). For other cases addressing the validity question, see also
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1275 (1968 & Supp. 1981).
;5 See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983) (holding that assignment of priorities is a question
for state law). See also Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 432 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.
Va. 1977) (holding that priorities of interest must be decided under state law), afd,
582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Northern Ill. Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp.
121 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (federal recordation is the initial inquiry, but priorities are
assigned under state law); Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82
Ill. App. 3d 1,401 N.E.2d 1340 (1980) (validity and priority of interests decided under
state law). Compare Gary, 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), and these other cases with
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
(holding that federal recordation requirements preempt state rules of priority), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A., 360 So. 2d
150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing Florida statute which states that section 503
of Act entirely preempts state law in regard to priorities of aircraft interests).
1, 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948). Actually, the court was interpreting the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, which contained Section 503. The Federal Aviation Act of
1958 reenacted Section 503 in identical form. See supra note 19.
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the FAA.6" The purchaser later sent the planes to a shop for
reconditioning.61 After the owner failed to pay for parts and
labor, the mechanic asserted a mechanic's and materialman's
lien against the aircraft under state law.62  A New Jersey fed-
eral district court rejected the claim made by the mechanic
and granted to the United States the superior right to fore-
close on its security interests in the aircraft. 63 The court con-
strued the Federal Aviation Act as a comprehensive statute
covering all aspects of aviation. 64 Based on this interpreta-
tion of the Act, the court held that state laws allowing unre-
corded interest holders to prevail over properly recorded
interest holders were necessarily preempted by the federal
statutory scheme.65
In 1970, the California Supreme Court addressed the same
issue in Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp. 16 In Dowell, the com-
peting interest holders in the aircraft were a prior secured
party, which filed its security interest with the FAA, and a
subsequent buyer in the ordinary course of business, which
did not file its bill of sale with the FAA.67 Under California's
version of the UCC, the buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness was assigned priority. 68 The court held, however, that
section 503 preempted priority rules under state law and cre-
ated a priority scheme based entirely on the order in which
competing interests are filed (i.e., a pure race statute).69 The
- 76 F. Supp. at 685.
Id.
2Id.
Id. at 688. Recordation under section 503 was construed as the only means by
which an aircraft interest can be transferred. Id.
14 id.
Id at 689.
3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
476 P.2d at 401-02. The UCC defines a buyer in the ordinary course of business
as:
[A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party
in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker . ...
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1977).
- 476 P.2d at 403. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9307 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984).
fi 476 P.2d at 404. Under a race statute, whoever first records his interest in an
aircraft prevails, regardless of the type of interest involved or when it was created.
19841
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United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.7 °
In Dowell, the California Supreme Court realized that if
California law had been applied, the subsequent purchaser in
the ordinary course of business would have prevailed, even
though it had not complied with federal recordation require-
ments.7" Such an outcome, the court reasoned, would be a
violation of the basic policy of section 503 since buyers in the
ordinary course of business would have no incentive to record
their purchases .72 To avoid this undesirable result the court
held that California commercial law concerning the validity
of unrecorded transfers and the assignment of priorities
among competing interest holders had been displaced by the
73Federal Aviation Act.
Dowell has not been well-received by either the federal or
state courts."4 With the exception of Florida, which has legis-
latively adopted the total federal preemption view,7 5 the deci-
sion has been viewed as an aberration.76 More recent
opinions have tracked the legislative history of section 503
and have concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law entirely, particularly in the assignment of priorities
among competing interest holders in the same aircraft.77
Commentators have also embraced this more restrictive read-
ing of the Act.78
The Fifth Circuit recently addressed the preemption issue
70 Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
7, 476 P.2d at 403.
7 Id
7' Id at 404. Cf Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., 679 F.2d 1264,
1270 (8th Cir. 1982) (Iowa UCC law determines ownership of aircraft, not who has
possession of title documents).
74 See ina note 76 and accompanying text.
11 See O'Neill v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (under 1975 Fla. Laws § 329.01, Florida law relegates to section 1403 determina-
tions of priority). Cf Carolina Aircraft Corp v. Commerce Trust Co., 289 So.2d 37
(Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (unrecorded mechanic's lien given priority over prior recorded
security interest under Florida law).
'1 No federal court has followed the decision. See Gary Aircraft v. General Dynam-
ics, 681 F.2d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1982) for a thorough discussion of the majority view.
11 See in/ta notes 79-84, 156-158 and accompanying text.
7' See Sigman,supra note 25, at 384; Scott,supra note 30, at 202. See also Note, Taking
the Lender for a Ride. Section 1403 of this Federal Aviation Act and the Buyer in the Ordinagy
Course of Business, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205 (1979).
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in Gagy Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamis Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft
Corp.)." A prior secured party and a subsequent purchaser
in the ordinary course of business claimed interests in an air-
craft.8° Both parties had filed their instruments with the
FAA.8 In an exhaustive opinion, the court held that section
503 lacked conclusive Congressional intent to preempt state
substantive laws completely.82 The court construed section
503 as a national recording system only and not as a federal
priority statute.83 Accordingly, the court applied Texas law,
which granted priority to the buyer in the ordinary course of
business.84 Because Gagt Aticraft did not involve an unre-
corded aircraft transfer, the court did not consider the extent
of federal preemption in instances where an interest valid
under state law is not recorded with the FAA.85
Even before Congress enacted section 506, several courts
deferred questions of validity, actual notice and good faith to
state law. 6 This dual system of federal recordation and state
law determination of validity and priority functioned much
like the UCC scheme for contractual liens. 7 Yet federal and
state law did not always operate independently. More specif-
7, 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
- Id. at 367.
fd
" Id at 372.
a Id The court stated, "In sum, the legislative history suggests that the main con-
cern of Congress was to create a central filing system, leaving the effect of filing to the
states." Id
- Id
15 Id The court suggests three possible meanings of "validity":
[Validity] may mean nothing more than that recordation with the FAA
will assure the instrument such "validity" as state law grants a recorded
instrument. [I]f the term "valid" refers to enforceability a literal inter-
pretation would lead to irrational results . . . . Still, we could read the
statute as giving "validity" in the sense of priority to recorded interests
otherwise "valid" under state law-that is, "valid" in the sense of com-
plying with formalities and requirements of consideration.
Id at 371.
- See Aircraft Inv. Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid Equip. Co., 205 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.
Mich. 1962) (holding that a conveyance must be valid under state law before recorda-
tion with FAA has any effect); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599
(E.D. Ark. 1964) (holding that an instrument's underlying validity must be determined
under state law).
"I Under the UCC, a financing statement evidencing the creation of a security inter-
est must usually be filed before an interest is perfected. UCC §§ 9-302-9-305, 9-402
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ically, it became unclear whether the "validity" of a convey-
ance should be determined under state law prior to and apart
from the determination of the effects of filing or nonfiling
under federal law,"8 or whether FAA recordation should be
the threshold question in every case.89
While the cases in this area involve many different fact pat-
terns,' generally, for purposes of this discussion, they fall into
two categories: (1) those involving competing interests, all of
which have been recorded with the FAA,9 ' and (2) those in-
volving competing interests where one party has filed his in-
terest and another has not.92 The critical issue in the first
category of cases is the assignment of priorities.93 The issue in
the second category of cases is the "validity" of the competing
interests under both state and federal law.94 The discussion
that follows will focus on the latter issue.
In Lochhead v. GA. C Fnance Corp. of Camelback, 5 the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals squarely addressed the "validity"
problem. The plaintiff purchased an airplane, paid the full
96 slepurchase price and took possession. The seller kept the bill
of sale and promised to file it with the FAA, but did not do
(1972). Article 9 also contains specific rules regarding priorities of interests. UCC
§§ 9-301, 9-307-9-316 (1972).
I'll See irhia text accompanying notes 93-139.
See, e.g., Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1289-99 (1968 & Supp. 1981).
'" See Lochhead v. G.A.C. Finance Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d
655 (1968) (first purchaser failed to record his ownership while second purchaser did);
Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc., 227 F. Supp 411 (M.D.N.C. 1961) (first pur-
chaser failed to file his interest with FAA until after seller fraudulently mortgaged the
same plane to a bank). See also infra note 91 for a list of cases in which all competing
interest holders had recorded their interests with the FAA.
11 See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983); Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 432 F.
Supp. 763 (W.D. Va. 1977), affd, 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Sanders v. M.D. Air-
craft Sales, 575 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1978); Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank &
Trust, 82 Il App. 3d, 401 N.E.2d 1340 (1980).
2 See inra text accompanying notes 95-118, 119-135.
1:1 For an exhaustive study of the priority question in cases where all interest holders
have recorded their interests with the FAA see Comment, The Impact of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 on Buyers in the Ordinay Course of Business, 48 J. AIR LAW & COM. 835
(1983).
", See infia text accompanying notes 95-104.
6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d 655 (1968).
Id. at 656.
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so.97 The seller then fraudulently sold the same aircraft to
the defendant.9" The defendant received the bill of sale and
recorded it with the FAA but never took possession of the
aircraft. 99 The court held that under state law the plaintiff's
title was superior because it had paid the full purchase price
and taken physical possession of the airplane.'I° Mere recor-
dation by the second purchaser of its void instrument of title
could not defeat the first purchaser's prior ownership.' In
Lochhead the threshold issue was the underlying validity of
the transfers under state law, not whether one or both parties
had filed their interests pursuant to section 503.02 Indeed,
other courts have held that an invalid conveyance under state
law cannot be transformed into a valid conveyance through
recordation with the FAA. 103
The Lochhead court's interpretation of section 503 directly
contradicts the Dowell holding because under the latter's
view, recordation with the FAA is the only method of convey-
ing an interest in an aircraft, regardless of state laws to the
contrary. 1°4 Along the same line, several courts have held
that the only way instruments conveying interests in aircraft
can be effective against third parties is by filing them with the
FAA.0 5 But these decisions did not clarify whether an unre-
corded instrument itself is invalid against third parties or





... Id. at 658.
Id at 657-58. The court placed heavy emphasis on possession of the aircraft as an
element of the sale. Id.
02 Id at 656-57.
In Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Ark. 1964), an
Arkansas federal district court stated that "compliance with § 1403 [503] does not vali-
date a conveyance or other instrument which is lacking in initial or inherent validity as
a contract document between the original parties." Id at 603. See also Idabel Nat'l
Bank v. Tucker, 544 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
1" See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
1"1r See Aircraft Inv. v. Pezzani & Reid Equipment Co., 205 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.
Mich. 1962).
; See Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 35 (E.D. Penn. 1976).
The district court stated,
1984]
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In Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc., 107 an aircraft dealer
fraudulently mortgaged an airplane that he had previously
sold to a third party. At the time the mortgagee bank
checked FAA records to verify the dealer's ownership of the
airplane, the third party purchaser had not recorded his
purchase, though he did file his title with the FAA several
months later. 08 Although it was decided prior to the effec-
tive date of section 506, in Marsden a North Carolina federal
district court awarded title and possession to the third party
mortgagee, who had no knowledge of the seller's wrongdoing
because the real owner of the airplane neglected to promptly
file his title with the FAA. °9 In the court's view, the critical
question was if and when the first purchaser had recorded his
instrument with the FAA," ° not whether the second convey-
ance was valid under applicable state law."'
An Illinois court utilized a two-pronged test to analyze
competing instruments in Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer
Bank and Trust Co. 112 The plaintiff purchased an airplane
from a dealer and took possession." 3 Later, after the dealer
was found to be insolvent, its lender foreclosed on security
interests in the dealer's inventory and repossessed the air-
plane purchased by the plaintiff." 4 The court's first inquiry
was whether the instrument, under state law, created the in-
The Federal Aviation Act does not adopt a notice filing system with re-
spect to conveyances, but instead requires that the instrument of convey-
ance through which the party claims the interest must itself be filed with
the Administrator for recording. The . . . instrument is invalid as to
third parties without actual notice unless that instrument is on file ....
Id. (emphasis in text).
227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C. 1961).
Id at 414.
Id. at 418. For a case construing the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act under the same
analysis, see Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949)
(subsequent purchaser of airplane prevailed over prior unrecorded purchaser of same
airplane).
I Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc., 227 F. Supp. at 415. See also Dawson v.
General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950) (unrecorded purchaser
held to be inferior in right to a recorded interest holder).
.. Compare supra text accompanying notes 95-103 with the court's holding.
12 82 Il1. App. 3d 1, 401 N.E.2d 1340, 1346 (1980).
401 N.E.2d at 1342.
Id at 1343.
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terest claimed. 115 If both instruments satisfied this initial
test, the next question was the assignment of priority under
applicable state law. 116 This test assumed that both instru-
ments had been recorded.' 17 Consequently, the court failed
to decide if federal recordation is a prerequisite to validity
under state law or whether it becomes relevant only after an
instrument is deemed valid under applicable state law." 8
The Tenth Circuit in CIM International v. United States 19 re-
fused to make recordation under section 503 an absolute re-
quirement for a conveyance or instrument to be valid. 20 The
case involved the seizure of an airplane by the government in
satisfaction of federal tax liens filed against the owner. 121 The
financer of the aircraft, which held an unrecorded security
interest in the airplane, filed a complaint for improper
seizure.122 The Ninth Circuit reversed a summary judgment
for the United States and remanded the case for further fact-
finding. 12 3 The court stated, "Nothing in the Act makes all
unrecorded interests in aircraft at all times, against all per-
sons, under all circumstances, and for all purposes, invalid
solely because they are not recorded.' 1 24 Except in cases
where a third party has actual notice of an unrecorded instru-
ment, the court declined to enumerate any specific instances
where failure to record a transfer would not effect that trans-
fer's validity. 125
An Indiana court in Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly
Bank 126 concluded that the validity and priority of an instru-
ment under state law cannot be determined until an instru-
"I, Id. at 1344, 1346.
Id at 1346.
, Id. at 1346-47.
Compare supra text accompanying notes 66-73 with supra text accompanying
notes 100- 103 for a discussion of these two contrary wiews.
641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980).
I d.
,2, Id at 673.
122 Id.
,23 Id at 680.
,24 Id at 674.
125 Id at 674-75.
,26 139 Ind. App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966).
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ment has been filed under federal law. 127 In Crescent City, a
prior secured party challenged a mechanic's lien asserted by
an aircraft dealer for parts installed on an airplane at the
owner's request.' 28 The court found the mechanic's lien to be
defective because it was not recorded with the FAA.129
Under this construction of the Act, "validity" under state law
is hinged upon the requirement of recordation.130 Moreover,
the holding strongly suggests that all interests and liens must
be evidenced by writings. 131
Contrary to the holding in Crescent City, several courts have
upheld the validity under state law of mechanics and posses-
sory liens against third parties in the absence of recordation
under section 503.132 An example is Holiday Airh'nes v. WorldAirways (In re Holday Airlnes). '33 In Holiday, an aircraft
mechanic failed to record his consensual possessory lien with
the FAA, but the lien was valid-under California law.'34 The
Ninth Circuit, applying section 506, ruled that the lien was
valid notwithstanding the creditor's failure to file his
interest. 35
In summary, section 503 and section 506 are ambiguous
statutes.' 36 Both federal and state courts agree that the Act
creates a uniform filing system that displaces similar state fil-
1' 219 N.E.2d at 449. The court recognized that the "validity" of an interest or
conveyance is determined under state law, but not until such interest or conveyance
has been recorded. Id.
,26 Id at 447.
,21 Id at 448.
,:. Id Accord Catlin Aviation Co. v. Equilease Corp., 626 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1981). See
in:ia text accompanying notes 151-155.
,:, 219 N.E.2d 446, 449. See tifra text accompanying note 154.
1:12 See Holiday Airlines v. Pacific Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines), 620 F.2d
731 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that underlying validity of a statutory mechanic's lien is a
question reserved to the states); Industrial Nat'l Bank of Rhode Island v. Butler Avia-
tion Int'l, 370 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that Congress did not intend to
subject statutory liens to FAA filing requirements); Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Com-
merce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (unrecorded mechanic's lien
held superior to prior recorded security interest).
647 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id at 980-81.
'" Id The court made it clear that its holding does not extend to consensual liens
where the lienholder is not in possession of the aircraft. Id.
'1:1 See supra text accompanying notes 27-40.
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ing systems.' 37 Additionally, a large majority of courts limit
the scope of section 503 to recordation only.1 38  Under this
more limited construction state laws are properly applied to
determine the inherent validity of conveyances and instru-
ments, as well as priorities among competing interests. 139 Yet
courts have been unable to consistently resolve the conflict
between validity under state law and validity under section
503 in cases where the two bodies of law overlap. 40
III. PHILKO A VIA TION, INC. V SHACKET
The District Court in Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales,
Inc. 141 found no need to consider the effect of the Shackets'
failure to record their ownership since it concluded that
Philko was not a "purchaser.' 42 The court found that under
Illinois commercial law a bona fide purchaser is entitled to
priority over a prior recorded security interest. 143 On the ba-
sis of this rule it reasoned that an unrecorded bona fide pur-
chaser should also prevail over a subsequently recorded
security interest. 14 4 In the district court's opinion, questions of
validity and priority are intermingled without any considera-
tion of the effect of recordation or nonrecordation under the
Act. 145
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit amplified the trial court's
application of section 506.46 Under Illinois law title passed
"I See supra note 25.
'13 See supra note 58.
'"9 See supra text and accompanying notes 82-83, 86-87.
,40 See supra notes 56-140 and accompanying text.
14 497 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
142 Id at 1267.
,43 Id at 1269.
,44 Id. at 1270, 1271.
145 Id.
,46 Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc. 681 F.2d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1982). The Court of
Appeals first considered the "validity" of each of the two claimed titles in light of
applicable Illinois law. Id. at 510-12. There was some dispute that the Shackets did not
acquire good title from Smith because Smith had not paid the Piper distributor for
the airplane at the time of the sale to the Shackets. Id at 511. However, under UCC
§ 2-403(2), when goods are entrusted to a dealer, the dealer has power to convey all the
entruster's rights to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Shacket v. Roger Smith
Aircraft Sales, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1980). For the UCC definition
of a "buyer in the ordinary course of business," see supra note 67.
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to the Shackets, the original purchasers, when they paid the
full purchase price and took possession of the aircraft.'47 As a
result, according to the Seventh Circuit, in the second fraud-
ulent transaction, the seller, Roger Smith, had no interest to
convey to the second buyer, Philko, and thus the bill of sale
transfered to Philko was void.' 48 On this basis the court af-
firmed the summary judgment in favor of the Shackets.'49
Arguing before the Supreme Court, the second buyer did
not attack the outcome under state law, but rather the analy-
sis used by the lower courts. 5' It argued that while federal
preemption is not absolute, section 503 does preempt substan-
tive state law concerning oral aircraft sales.' 5 ' The Supreme
Court agreed with this reasoning and concluded that recor-
dation of a conveyance with the FAA is the initial inquiry in
determining which of two or more competing interests will
prevail. 12 The Court held that although the Shackets' oral
purchase gave them good title under Illinois law, their title
was defective because of their failure to record a writing with
the FAA.' 53 The Court interpreted section 503(c) to "mean
that every aircraft transfer must be evidenced by an instru-
ment, and every such instrument must be recorded, before
the rights of innocent third parties can be affected."' 54 Con-
sequently, state laws permitting oral aircraft transfers are
now preempted by section 503(c). 55
In dicta, the Court gave informal approval to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding in Gay Aircraft that federal law does not control
assignment of priorities once instruments are recorded.
56
The Court stated that it was "inclined" to adopt the Fifth
,.7 Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1982).
-4 Id at 512.
- Id The parties did not contest the applicability of Illinois law over the laws of
other states. The focus of the dispute concerned the relative applicability of Illinois
and federal law. Id.






Id at 2480. The assignment of priority issue was not reached by the Court be-
cause the Shackets' interest was "invalid." Id.
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Circuit's reasoning in Gag Aircrafl, but did not expressly do
so.' This language strongly suggests that preemption under
section 503 is not as comprehensive as thought by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Dowell. 5 ' Yet it is also true that the
underlying validity of a conveyance is not always a pure
question of state law as was thought to be the case in
Lochhead. 59 Validity under state law, as used in section 506,
is dependent upon validity under section 503.160 Any conflict
between the two must be resolved in favor of federal law.16 1
The Supreme Court further held that failure to record a
transfer affects not only the validity of the instrument evi-
dencing the transfer but also the validity of the transfer itself
with respect to third parties.162 The Court reached this con-
clusion by construing the statutory definition of "convey-
ance" more broadly than its plain language suggests. 6 3 The
Court interpreted the term to include oral transfers of aircraft
in addition to transfers evidenced by writings. 6 4
157 Id.
1 , See Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.),
681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983). In Ga7y, the Fifth
Circuit held that while section 503 of the Federal Aviation Act requires aircraft inter-
ests to be recorded, priorities of recorded interests are to be determined under applica-
ble state law. Id at 377. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76 for a discussion of
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp.
-11 See Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d 655,
657 (1968), dircussedsupra in text and accompanying notes 95-103.
,-" In other words, section 1406 does not defer to state law the question of whether
an unrecorded conveyance is valid, assuming that the third party to be affected by the
unrecorded interest does not have actual notice of such interest. A conveyance must
first be recorded with FAA before it can be valid under state law. See supra note 30.
1- Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2480 (1983). The lower courts
failed to consider the conflict between the superiority of the Shackets' title under state
law and the federal requirement that a conveyance be filed before third parties without
notice can be affected. See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 506 (7th Cir.
1982); Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. 11. 1980).
,62 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2479-80 (1983). The court rec-
ognized that mere invalidation of an unrecorded instrumenl would permit a purchaser
in possession to prove a conveyance through other means to the detriment of an inno-
cent third party. Such an outcome would destroy any incentive for the party in posses-
sion to file with the FAA. Id.
16. Id. The Act's definition covers instruments only. In order to prevent the result
discussed supra in note 162, the court was forced to construe the language differently
from its plain meaning. Id.
I6 Id.
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Though the opinion does not cite either Marsden or Crescent
City, it adopts the same view that recordation is the initial
inquiry where ownership of an aircraft is disputed. 165
Philko's title was voidable under state law, 166 but its recorda-
tion of the bill of sale with the FAA gave the transfer valid-
ity.' 67 The Phiko holding, however, does not nullify the
impact of state law under section 506 entirely. 168 Formalities
prescribed by local law must still be satisfied before a re-
corded instrument can be enforced against third parties.1 69
The requirement that an aircraft transfer be evidenced by
a writing is stressed, but the opinion does not rule out the
possibility that an unrecorded transfer may be valid under
special circumstances. 70 Examples of these special circum-
stances, however, were not given by the Court.' 7 ' This por-
tion of the opinion comports with CIM International, which
held that failure to record an interest is not always fatal.' 72
For this reason Philko does not create an inflexible statute of
frauds rule for all aircraft conveyances in all situations."'
, Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2478 (1983). See Marsden v.
Southern Flight Service, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C. 1961), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 107-111. Crescent City Aviation, Inc. v. Beverly Bank, 139 Ind.
App. 669, 219 N.E.2d 446 (1966), dscussedsupra in text accompanying notes 127-131.
See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1982).
See Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2480. Since Illinois law regard-
ing aircraft title transfers is now preempted, validity of title depends upon recordation.
Id.
"'m State law must still be used to determine whether a recorded instrument does in
fact create the interest asserted. See 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
6- Id
,70 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. In fact, the Court left open
the possibility of success by the Shackets on remand if they can show "reasonable dili-
gence" in their efforts to record their ownership. The opinion cites State Securities Co.
v. Aviation Enter., 355 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1966) (buyer filed instrument with FAA,
but recordation was refused). Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, refused to
adopt this language because the issue was not before the Court. Philko v. Shacket, 103
S. Ct. at 2481.
,,, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. The Court left the issue open on remand. Id. If the trial
court on remand were to find that Philko had actual knowledge of the prior sale to the
Shackets, the actual knowledge exception of section 503 of the Act would cause the
prior sale to be valid against Philko. See i'n/fa text accompanying notes 182-184.
172 See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982). See also CIM
Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 119-125.
,7:, See Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2480-81. If a recorded interest
holder could always assert the absence of a writing to defeat a prior unrecorded pur-
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PHILKO AVIATION, INC. V SHACKET
Since 1938, recordation has been critical in every aircraft
transfer.174 Still, there will always be cases where a novice
buys an aircraft, pays for it, flies it home and forgets about
the purchase. 7 ' Additionally, honest people like the Shack-
ets will continue to be hoodwinked by dishonest sellers. 176
Prior to Philko, state laws protecting good faith purchasers
favored such parties.' 77 Now, however, all interest holders in
aircraft are charged with executing an instrument of convey-
ance and filing the instrument with the FAA.'78 Failure to do
either will deprive a party of superior title or interest regard-
less of good faith. 7 9 The integrity of the federal filing system
will be bolstered by the Philko decision since recordation is
now mandatory in order to validate a conveyance.8 0 While
the relative priority of an interest will continue to be decided
under state law, an innocent third party who checks FAA
records prior to receiving an interest in an aircraft will not be
deprived of the chance of enforceability. 18 1
chaser, the effect would be the same as if the Act contained an express statute of frauds
requirement.
, See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g. , Lochhead v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d
655, 656 (1968).
- Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2477, 2478.
,77 See e.g., Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill.
1980). Following the strong policy formulated by the UCC in favor of bona fide pur-
chasers, the district court granted priority to the Shackets. Id. However, it does not
appear that the Shackets would have been granted summary judgment if Philko had
been adjudged a good faith purchaser as well. Id at 1269. But see Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P. 2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970),cert. dented, 404
U.S. 823 (1971) (holding that section 503 of the Act preempts all state laws affecting
transfers of aircraft interests).
,78 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2478. The Supreme Court made
no disinction between secured parties and good faith purchasers as far as recordation is
concerned. Only if competing interests are filed will the distinction become relevant in
the assignment of priorities under state law. Id.
179 Id.
- Id. at 2479. If buyers in the ordinary course of business received protection
against prior and subsequent recorded interest holders regardless of whether they com-
plied with the filing requirement the "central clearinghouse" idea would be frustrated.
Id. See also Amicus Brief of Aircraft Finance Association at 3, Philko Aviation, Inc. v.
Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983).
,8, The opposite result was reached by the lower courts in Shacket v. Roger Smith
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In disputes between buyers and sellers, state law is not pre-
empted.18 The need for filing is obviated when the parties
to a conveyance are involved. 18 3 This result follows because
both parties have actual notice, the very aim of the FAA fil-
ing system. 84 Therefore, oral conveyances of aircraft will
continue to be recognized in these situations.185
The holding in Philko does not make section 503 a pure
race statute. 86 It does require that a prior transfer of an air-
craft be on file at the time a third party purchases or receives
an interest in the same aircraft without actual notice.1 87 In
this respect, the first party to file would prevail. The outcome
is unclear if the first transferee has not had a reasonable
amount of time to file his instrument before a subsequent
conveyance to a third party occurs.188 Here it would seem
that both interests would be valid and that state law, pursu-
ant to section 506, would assign priority to the claims. 8 9 If
section 503 were read to mean that a transferee must file an
instrument instantaneously, inequitable results could
occur.190
Assuming that most purchasers and creditors continue to
file instruments with the FAA, Philko will have minimal im-
pact.1 9' Likewise, the Court's unwillingness to completely ap-
prove of Gag Aircraft does not rule out preemption of state
Aircraft Sales, Inc, 497 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Philko checked FAA
records prior to its purchase and recorded its bill of sale promptly after the transfer. Id.
- Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. See Bishop v. R.S. Evans
East Point, Inc., 80 Ga. App. 324, 56 S.E.2d 134 (1949) (recordation irrelevant as be-
tween purchaser and seller).
8I Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c).
" See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2480-81.
' See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
87 Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2478.
' 49 U.S.C. § 1403 does not contain language giving a party a set number of days
or a reasonable period in which to file an instrument.
- See, e.g., In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 103 S.
Ct. 3110 (1983).
-9 This would seem to fit within the "reasonable diligence" exception alluded to by
the Supreme Court in Philko. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2481
(1983). See CIM Int'l v. United States, 641 F.2d 671, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1980).
19, Where competing interests are recorded, the issue is assignment of priorities. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 93.
CASENOTES AND STA TUTE NOTES
law in the assignment of priorities altogether.'92 Yet it is un-
likely that any court will adopt the total preemption view
expressed in Dowell. 93
The opinion does not provide a way for oral purchasers to
perfect their titles through recordation.' 94 A conveyance
must be evidenced by a writing, but the types of writings that
will suffice are not specified.' 95 This same problem applies to
mechanic's lien holders as well.' 96 It is unclear what effect
Philko will have on these statutory liens. Although the courts
are split over whether mechanic's liens and other possessory
liens must be recorded with the FAA, the broad language of
the Philko holding suggests that federal recordation is
necessary. '97
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Aviation Act requires that aircraft convey-
ances be recorded before third parties can be affected. 98 A
necessary corollary of this rule is that a writing must be exe-
cuted since section 503 requires that the instrument convey-
ing an interest be filed.' 99 Any state law that conflicts with
this duty is displaced. 2" State law is not preempted, how-
ever, where competing interests have been timely recorded
with the FAA.2"' Once it has been recorded, an instrument
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 156-161.
-9:1 See Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1970), dzscussedsupra in text accompanying notes 66-78.
' If the Shackets had wished to notify the FAA of their purchase using some other
document besides the bill of sale, it is not clear whether third parties would have re-
ceived constructive notice. It appears that a writing executed by the parties to a sale
must be filed. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2478 (1983). Section
503(e) of the Federal Aviation Act requires that an instrument evidencing a transfer be
acknowledged by a notary before the FAA may record it. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403(e)
(1976).
, See generaly Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1279. See also Sigman, supra note 25, at 321.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-135.
' See supra note 132. See also Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2478
(1983).
- Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2478 (1983). See supra text ac-
companying notes 150-155.
- Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. at 2478.
o Id.
-1 See 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
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must also be a valid writing under state law.2 °2 Additionally,
interests that are valid under section 503 and state law are
assigned priorities under state law.20 3
The Philko decision reinforces the importance of filing with
the FAA. Moreover, the decision clarifies the conflict be-
tween the validity of a conveyance under state law and valid-
ity under the Act. The decision shows the Court's willingness
to implement the Congressional intent behind section 503,
but at the same time it expresses a hesitancy to preempt state
law unless the conflict is direct. If state and federal courts
permit numerous exceptions to the recordation requirement,
the effectiveness of the holding will be eroded. It is unlikely,
however, that the Supreme Court or Congress will go so far as
to make section 503 a pure race statute in the near future.
Britt D. Monts
22 Id.
21. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1983). See In re Gary
Aircraft Corp., discussedsupra in text accompanying notes 79-85.
TORTS-MISREPRESENTATION EXCEPTION IN FTCA Ac-
TIONS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT INSPECTION AND CERTIFI-
CATION-The exception to liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for claims arising out of misrepresentation does
not bar suits where a party seeks recovery for government
negligence in inspection and supervision of construction.
Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1098 (1983).
Parties seeking recovery from the federal government for
negligent inspection and certification of aircraft and related
products may find additional support for their contentions in
a recent case involving government inspection of the con-
struction industry.' Onilea Neal received a Rural Housing
loan from the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)2 to fi-
nance a new home after she was unable to obtain credit from
other sources. In August, 1977, she entered into a contract
with Home Marketing Associates, Inc. (Home Marketing) for
the construction of a prefabricated home.' According to the
I Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the potential
impact of Neal on aviation law, see infra text accompanying notes 80-183.
2 Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1090. The FmHA is the government agency within the Depart-
ment of Agriculture authorized by statute to extend financial assistance for home con-
struction and purchases to persons of low to moderate income residing in rural areas.
Housing Act of 1949, § 502, 42 U.S.C. § 1472 (1976).
:1 Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089, 1090 (1983). The relevant portion of the Housing
Act of 1949, § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1976) authorizing such loans provides:
If the Secretary [of Agriculture] determines that an applicant is eligible
for assistance as provided in section 1471 of this title and that the appli-
cant has the ability to repay in full the sum to be loaned with interest,
giving due consideration to the income and earning capacity of the ap-
plicant and his family from the farm and other sources, and the mainte-
nance of a reasonable standard of living for the owner and the occupants
of said farm, a loan may be made by the Secretary . ...
42 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1976).
4 Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1090-91. The "contract method" chosen by the plaintiff was
one of several financing options permitted by applicable federal regulations. 7 C.F.R.
§ 1804.4 (1977). Under the contract method, a builder is required to perform construc-
tion of the home in accordance with a contract approved by the FmHA, although the
agency is not a party to it. 7 C.F.R. § 1804.4(d) (1977). FmHA regulations provided
for significant involvement by the government agency. Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1091 n.l.
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contract, construction was to conform to plans approved by
FmHA, which retained the right to inspect and test all mater-
ials and workmanship and reject any that the agency consid-
ered defective.' The FmHA inspector's final report indicated
that Home Marketing's construction was in compliance with
the drawings and specifications approved by FmHA.6
Mrs. Neal moved into her new home and discovered
shortly thereafter that the heat pump was not working.7 She
notified FmHA officials, who conducted a complete inspec-
tion during which additional construction defects were dis-
covered.8 The defects included deviations from the plans
approved by FmHA and from the agency's Minimum Prop-
erty Standards.9 Mrs. Neal brought suit against FmHA'0
For example, an FmHA official was authorized to assist in the selection of the building
contractor, review all plans and specifications, make periodic and final inspections,
withhold final payment until full contract compliance was achieved, and assist the
borrower with regard to claims arising under the builder's warranty. Id.
Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1091.
6 Id
7Id
a Id Briefs filed in the case specified the thirteen additional problems detected, such
as the use of low quality paint which flaked, the use of staples in the roof truss and poor
plumbing workmanship. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 8, Block v. Neal, 103 S.
Ct. 1089 (1983).
N eal, 103 S. Ct. at 1091. Examples of the deviations from the Minimum Property
Standards (MPS) include the absence of grade marks on floor joist or roof truss lum-
ber, improper caulking and inadequate fire resistance ratings in the wall assembly.
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 8, Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983). A variety
of problems in both materials and workmanship were also noted. Id
m Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1091. The defendant in the suit was the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. Id at 1089. At the time the original complaint was filed, the Secretary was Rob-
ert Bergland. Neal v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). FmHA requested
that Home Marketing correct the problems in accordance with the builder's warranty,
but the contractor refused. Id Plaintiff.then sought compensation from FmHA, but
the agency refused to pay for any defects. Id. By the time the suit reached the United
States Supreme Court, several of the defects for which FmHA refused responsibility,
including the faulty plumbing and heating and cooling system, had been corrected at
FmHA's expense. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 11, Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct.
1089 (1983). The reason for FmHA's reconsideration of the matter is unclear, al-
though the Fair Housing Act does provide for a construction defect program. 42
U.S.C. § 1479(c) (1981). Although-the issue was not addressed by the Supreme Court,
there is authority to indicate that the availability of an alternative remedy in fact
precludes any additional recovery from the United States. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (third-party action for indemnity against the
United States barred where Congress has provided limited recovery scheme for injuries
involving military personnel). Still Mrs. Neal sought compensation for deficiencies
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)," alleging that
the defects were partly attributable to the negligent inspec-
tion and supervision of the construction of her house by
FmHA employees. 12
The district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'" Al-
though the court recognized that the negligence claim was
premised on a duty to supervise and inspect imposed by
FmHA regulations,14 it concluded that such regulations were
intended solely to protect the security interest held by the
government. 5 The court analogized the position of the
FmHA to that of a mortgagee seeking to limit its risks
through inspection and supervision of the construction pro-
vided for in FmHA regulations.' 6 The court agreed with the
government's position that "any benefit to the borrower is
and other damages not redressed. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 11, Block v.
Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976). The general grant of jurisdiction to the
district courts appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), which provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 *of this title, the district
courts. . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. § 1346(b).
,2 Neal, 103 S. Ct. at 1090. At the trial court level, plaintiff raised two other theories
of recovery: (1) breach of contract on the basis of the agency's failure to provide techni-
cal assistance, including inspection and supervision of construction, and (2) detrimen-
tal reliance for failure to perform regulatory obligations as promised. Neal v.
Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). The district court found no con-
tractual obligation in the Act or regulations to support plaintiffs contract theory. Id.
at 514, 515. As to the detrimental reliance theory, the court found that the promises
said to induce plaintiff to enter into the contracts with Home Marketing and FmHA
were made only after plaintiff had already executed these contracts. Therefore, the
court's opinion was that such promises could not really have induced plaintiff. Id at
515.
Neal v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512, 516 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
Id. at 515. See supra note 4.
Neal v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
Id at 514.
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purely incidental."17 Since the court found no duty running
to the plaintiff," no actionable breach could be claimed.19
Disagreeing with the lower court's analysis regarding the
negligence claim,2" the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed. The government petitioned for certiorari for a review
of the Sixth Circuit's holding that the district court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.2 1 Held, affirmed The excep-
tion to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims
arising out of misrepresentation does not bar suits where a
party seeks recovery for government negligence in inspection
and supervision of construction. Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089
(1983).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Defin'tional Framework
The notion that no suit may be prosecuted against the sov-
ereign absent his consent was well ingrained in English law.22
In the United States, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
adopted early by judicial decision.23 It was thought that
there could be no legal right against the authority that makes
the laws on which the right depends.24 The doctrine had two
facets: (1) only Congress could waive the federal govern-
ment's immunity; and (2) any waivers should be strictly
, Id. at 515.
Id at 516. The court agreed with the government's argument that policy consid-
erations, as well, limited the liability of the government in the inspection context, since
"[t]o hold the FmHA liable for the shoddy work of the contractor would be tanta-
mount to making a mortgagee the warrantor of the quality of its security." Id. at 515.
19 Id.
- Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1981). The court of appeals
agreed with the lower court's analysis regarding the contract claim and did not reach
the issue of detrimental reliance. Id. at 1181.
Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089, 1092 (1983).
2 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 51, at 2-4 (1983). In his dis-
cussion of the "king's prerogative", Blackstone points out that "Ithe law ascribes to the
king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence . . . . Hence it is, that no suit or
action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can
have jurisdiction over him." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *241-42. See
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793) (an early elaboration on the notion of
sovereign immunity as it pertained to this country).
v Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
21 W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 2 (1957).
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construed.25
Relief from the doctrine was provided through a system of
private bills 26 granting recovery for injuries caused by gov-
ernment agencies.27 In time, this system became bogged
down with a great number of petitions. 28 The FTCA29 was
passed by Congress in 1946 to simplify recovery procedures
and to ameliorate the harsh results of sovereign immunity as
it pertained to the federal government."0 Additionally, nu-
merous exceptions 31 to the FTCA's broad statement of liabil-
ity were also provided.12 While Congress explicitly preserved
the immunity of the United States in certain areas,33 the leg-
islative history of the FTCA sheds little light on the purpose
25 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 22, at 2-4.
21 W WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 2. The private bill incorporated the claim of a
private party and the relief sought. Congress would then consider the bill presented by
one of its members, acting in a quasi-judicial role. I L. JAYSON, supra note 22, at 2-6.
217 W. WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 2.
- Id. at 3.
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976).
H.R. Doc. No. 562, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1941). See also W. WRIGHT, supra note
24, at 5. The doctrine is also applicable to state and local government, although some-
what different considerations are involved at that level. See Stone & Rinker, Governmen-
tal Liabihtyfor Negligent Inspections, 57 TUL. L. REv. 328 (1982).
,, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1976). Several of the exceptions are commonly raised,
for example, section 2680(a), claims based upon the acts or omissions of government
employees exercising a discretionary function; section 2680(b), claims arising out of the
loss or negligent transmission of postal matter; section 2680(i), claims for damages
caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury; section 2680(j), claims arising out of
combatant activities of the military during war. The applicability of other exceptions
appears somewhat less common: for example, section 2680(f), claims for damages
caused by the imposition of a quarantine; section 2680(1), claims arising from the ac-
tivities of the Tennessee Valley Authority; section 2680(m), claims arising from Pan-
ama Canal Company activities.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The liability provision states:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place
where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United
States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons respec-
tively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof.
Id. For an overview of the nature and frequency of claims brought under the FTCA,
see I L. JAYSON, supra note 22, at 1.
:1:1 See supra note 31.
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underlying each exception.3 4 Thus, the meaning of the enu-
merated exceptions has been developed largely in the
courts 5
The misrepresentation exception has been raised often as a
defense in FTCA actions.3 6 Although the Act permits tort re-
covery against the United States in general terms,37 express
exceptions are listed in section 2680.38 Subsection (h) pre-
cludes recovery of "any claim arising out of
misrepresentation. 39
Lower federal courts40 struggled with the misrepresentation
exception, absent any guidance from the United States
Supreme Court.4' While willing to construe the FTCA liber-
ally in order to effectuate its overall remedial purpose, the
courts were highly reluctant to permit recovery where the
facts before them indicated some form of misrepresentation. 2
A conflict among the circuits erupted in 1961, when, in United
States v. Neustadt,43 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held a district court finding in favor of homeowners who
brought an action under the FTCA.44
" W. WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 8-9.
See, e.g., Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (negligent denial of
social security benefits); Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445 (1 lth
Cir. 1982) (negligent denial of veterans benefits); Green v. United States, 629 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1980) (failure to warn cattle farmers of the full consequences of DDT on
grazing areas); Redmond v. United States, 518 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1975) (misrepresen-
tation by government agents in securities transaction); Saxton v. United States, 456
F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1972) (erroneous diagnosis of diseased cattle); United Air Lines v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dirmssed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (air controllers'
failure to warn of occupied flight pattern). See also infra note 80 and accompanying
text.
+M d
' 28 U.S.C. § 2674. See supra note 32 for text of FTCA liability provision.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n). See supra note 31 for a list of exceptions commonly raised.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) gives the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See supra note 11 for the text of section
1346(b).
W. WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 8-9.
*+ Id
281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960).
44 Id The cases from other courts of appeal in conflict with Neustadt were: Hall v.
United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959); Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th
Cir. 1954); National Mfg. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954); and Jones v.
United States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953).
CASENOTES AND STA TUTE NOTES
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Neustadt in light
of the conflict and the importance of the question.45 That
case involved an appraisal by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) following its inspection of a home and lot to
determine the eligibility of the property for FHA mortgage
insurance.46 The buyers of the home financed the purchase
through a loan secured by FHA mortgage insurance.
Shortly after moving into their new home, they discovered
numerous cracks throughout the house which were eventu-
ally traced to a severe foundation problem.4" The homeown-
ers brought suit against the United States under the FTCA
alleging that the FHA had been negligent in conducting its
inspection and appraisal and that they justifiably relied on
these results in making their purchase. 9
The Supreme Court avoided the factual question of gov-
ernment liability,5° instead focusing its attention on the ap-
plicability of the misrepresentation exception. 5' The Court
rejected the argument raised by the plaintiffs that their com-
plaint centered on the negligent action of the government,
not merely on the inaccurate representation in the ap-
praisal.52 Instead, the Court deemed such an argument an
attempt to circumvent the misrepresentation exception of the
FTCA.5 3 In the Court's view, the applicability of the excep-
tion must be determined by looking beyond the language of
the pleading to the true cause of the complaint. 54 The Court
45 United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
" Id at 696-97. The FHA was authorized by the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1709 (1976) to insure loans secured by mortgages financing the purchase of private
residential property. The value included in the appraisal was used to establish the
maximum amount of mortgage insurance obtainable. Id
Id at 699.
Id at 700.
* Id at 700-01. Plaintiffs sought damages based on the difference between the fair
market value of the property and its purchase price, which plaintiffs claimed they
would not have paid but for the negligence of FHA. Id
" Id at 705 n.15.
Id at 701-11.
Id at 706-07.
r, Id at 703.
Id at 703-04. The Court characterized plaintiffs' argument as one stating that
"the bar of 2680(h) does not apply when the gist of the claim lies in neglgonce underly-
ing the inaccurate representation, ,e., when the claim is phrased as one 'arising out of'
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construed the language in the Act to encompass negligent, as
well as willful, misrepresentation by the government.55 Since
the damage to the plaintiffs in Neustadt occurred when they
relied upon the inaccurate FHA appraisal, their action was
one, in fact, for negligent misrepresentation barred by the ex-
ception in the FTCA.
56
B. Apphication of the Mirepresentation Exception
Subsequent cases have attempted to draw the often slip-
pery distinction raised in Neustadt between negligent action,
and negligent misrepresentation. 7 Some courts developed
simple formulations which were easy to apply but led to in-
consistent and often illogical results.58 One approach built
negligence rather than 'misrepresentation.' " Id The Court responded to the argument
with borrowed words:
"We must then look beyond the literal meaning of the language to ascer-
tain the real cause of complaint . . . .Plaintiff's loss came about when
the Government agents misrepresented the condition of the cattle, tell-
ing him they were diseased when, in fact, they were free from disease
.... This stated a cause of action predicated on a misrepresentation."
Id at 703 (quoting from Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1959)).
, Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 706-08. The elements of negligent misrepresentation are de-
tailed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965). The elements are: (1)
the supplying of false information in the course of business, profession or employment
in which the supplier of information has a pecuniary interest and he fails to exercise
reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information; (2) justifiable reliance
upon the information by the person receiving the information; and (3) pecuniary loss
suffered by the person receiving the information through reliance. Id. This aspect of
the decision was significant in view of the legislative history indicating that section
2680(h) was intended to encompass deliberate or intentional torts. See Gottlieb, The
Federal Tort Claims Act- A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 49 (1946) (citing H. R.
REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1946) which contain references to this general
exceptions clause as one aimed at "deliberate" acts). See also Bohlen, Misrepresentation as
Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1929) (discussing the distinct set of
rules applicable to negligent misrepresentation and deceit or fraud); Note, Federal Tort
Claims Act- Exceptions- Intentional Torts, 7 VAND. L. REV. 283, 284 (1954) (discussing
the fact that the common thread among the exceptions is their intentional character).
,' Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1961). The Court also examined the language and
legislative history of the National Housing Act, which provided for the inspection and
appraisal in question, and found nothing barring application of the exception to the
case before it. Id at 708-11.
" For an elaboration on the efforts by several courts in a variety of contexts, see
Comment, Neghgent Misrepresentation." A New Trap for the Unwary?, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1184
(1981).
m One observer has identified three distinct approaches arising from the case law:
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upon the traditional understanding of an action for negligent
misrepresentation which had been referred to by the Neusladt
Court in a footnote. 9 In that footnote the Court described
the action as having been confined generally "to the invasion
of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the
course of business dealings. '60 Thus the line defining the
boundaries of the exception was similarly drawn by some
courts to preclude recovery only where economic, rather than
personal, harm had been suffered.61
Other courts found ways to circumvent the distinction be-
tween personal and commercial contexts when the desired
outcome could not be obtained within such a framework. In
Ware v. United States,62 the court articulated its own fairly
vague test which turned on whether the injury was a direct or
indirect result of the representation made.63 Ware owned
cattle which had been tested by the Department of Agricul-
ture and found to have tuberculosis.64 As a result, almost two
(1) a determination whether the action primarily is based on negligent inspection or on
negligent misrepresentation; (2) a distinction on the basis of whether the claim is for
personal injury or merely for economic or financial loss; and (3) a determination of
whether any duty is owed to the plaintiff in the first place. Note, The Federal Seal of
Approval: Government Lzbility for Neghgent Inspection, 62 GEO. L.J. 937, 946 (1974). Of
course, the last approach permits the courts to avoid the definitional problem entirely.
See Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977) (containing a careful
elaboration on the question, particularly from a policy standpoint, where plaintiffs
alleged the government's failure to inspect or warn of aircraft's weight and crew irregu-
larities caused the crash in which passengers and crew were killed). See also Dombroff,
Certification and Inspection: An Overview of Government Liability, 47 J. AIR L. & CoM. 229,
237-40 (1982).
Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 706-07, 711 n.26.
Id at 711 n.26 (quoting from W. PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (1941)).
Some courts have gone so far as to say that the misrepresentation exception will
always apply in a commercial context. See Green v. United States, 629 F.2d 581, 584-
85 (9th Cir. 1980). But cf Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss.
1966) (where the court refused to determine applicability merely along economic
lines). See also Hatfield, The Nonliability of the Government for Certification of Arcraf, 17
FORUM 602, 623-24 (1982) (discusssing flaws in the distinction). The commer-
cial/personal injury distinction has been variously construed by the courts to turn not
only on physical personal injury alone, but on any personal matters in a general sense.
Cross Bros. Meat Packers v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Park v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 970, 979 (D. Or. 1981).
2 626 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1282.
' Id at 1280.
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hundred and fifty cattle were destroyed by the government,
but it was subsequently determined that only three were tu-
bercular.65 Plaintiff sued for damages arising from the gov-
ernment's error.66 The court held that the government's
negligent diagnosis led directly to the destruction of the cattle
and plaintiff's loss. 6 7 The misrepresentation exception did
not apply, since plaintiff himself took no action in reliance on
the government's misdiagnosis. Such reliance was an essen-
tial ingredient in actions grounded on negligent
misrepresentation.'
As in Ware, the opinion in Cross Brothers Meat Packers v.
United Statei 9 elaborates on the distinction involving direct,
as opposed to indirect, injury. In Cross Brothers, a meat pack-
ing company sought to recover for lost business and profits
allegedly caused by the failure of employees of the Agricul-
ture Department to grade the company's meat properly.7"
The court looked to the "essential substance" of the com-
plaint to determine whether the suit was one for damages re-'
sulting directly from negligent inspection and grading or
solely from improper grading and the plaintiff's reliance
thereon.7 The court held that the action was barred by the
misrepresentation exception, since conduct of the employees
from the Department of Agriculture did not directly damage
the meat or its value.72 The improper grading was a misrep-
resentation regarding the meat's quality upon which both
Cross Brothers and its customers relied to their detriment.73
The court gave little weight to the manner in which the ac-




"' Id at 1280.
' Id at 1283.
id
119 533 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
- Id at 1322.
72 Id
7. Id at 1325.
" Id. Accord Reynolds v. United States, 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1981) (involving
negligent inspection of a home by FmHA).
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C. Aircraft Cerlification
Common threads can be found running throughout the
various cases grounded on negligent inspection by the gov-
ernment.7" The misrepresentation defense is often raised in
addition to the discretionary function exception 76 which pro-
tects essential governmental decisionmaking from unreasona-
ble challenges in court.77 While the discretionary function
exception has been the focus of much of the literature,78 the
misrepresentation defense has been asserted effectively by the
government to retain its sovereign immunity. 79 Its use has
been particularly prevalent in cases involving the certifica-
tion and inspection of aircraft, where the government has
wide-ranging involvement.8 ° The Supreme Court is currently
considering two important cases in which the Ninth Circuit
7 See supra text accompanying notes 57-74 for a discussion of these points.
76 The discretionary function exception appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). It provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretion-
ary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
77 Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment:
An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. REV. 497, 528 (1976).
7a Id at 527-28.
79 See supra note 35 for a listing of cases.
-o In the aviation area, see, e.g., S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(V.A.R.I.G. Airlines) v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 2084 (1983) (certification of lavatory unit which caught fire, forcing crash land-
ing); United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983) (certification of defective fuel line for gasoline-burning cabin
heater in air taxi which subsequently crashed); Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d
1061 (6th Cir. 1981) (airworthiness certification of Cessna 177 which crashed shortly
after takeoff); Hoffman v. United States, 600 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1979) (certification of
aircraft which crashed); Knudsen v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(certification of aircraft with defective propellers); Summers v. United States, 480 F.
Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1979) (certification of defective aircraft engine); Uoyd v. Cessna
Aircraft, 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (airworthiness certification of defective
aircraft); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (certification
of defective aircraft sold to plaintiff). In other contexts, see cases cited supra note 35.
For an extensive discussion of the problem, see generally Note, supra note 58 (reviewing
government liability for negligent inspection in various fields).
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Court of Appeals refused to permit either defense in suits in-
volving airline crashes.8 1 Therefore, the aviation industry
provides a useful context within which to take a closer look at
the misrepresentation exception.82
The Federal Aviation Act of 195883 provides for one of the
most pervasive inspection programs affecting the general
public. 84 The cornerstone of the program is found in section
1423, which authorizes the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
to issue three categories of aircraft certificates. 85 First, the
type certificate is based on a Type Inspection Report through
which the manufacturer furnishes certain design and per-
formance data to the FAA during the manufacturer's devel-
opment and testing process.86  Second, the production
certificate is issued to permit the manufacturer to begin pro-
duction in conformity with certain models. 7 Finally, the
FAA issues an airworthiness certificate when it is satisfied
that the aircraft is in conformity with its type certificate and
capable of safe operation.88
In airline crash cases, recovery may be sought not only
from the airline and the manufacturer of the aircraft, but also
from the FAA for certifying the aircraft as fit.8 9 The United
States thus finds itself involved in a significant portion of air-
a, S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (V.A.R.I.G. Airlines) v. United
States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983); United Scot-
tish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084
(1983).
82 For a general discussion on the extent of government involvement in aircraft certi-
fication, see Howe, Airworthiness: The Government's Role, 17 FORUM 645 (1982).
- Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1423
(1976)).
4 Dombroff, supra note 58, at 230-32.
49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1976).
R, 49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1976).
- 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1976).
See generally Tompkins, The Liability of the United States for Negligent Certfication of
Aircraft, 17 FORUM 569 (1982) (reviewing the case law in which negligent certification
has been raised). The government is also vulnerable in other areas involving certifica-
tion and inspection to ensure airline safety. See, e.g., Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc., 546
F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (certification of parachute manufacturing process);
Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971) (erroneous plotting of aero-
nautical chart). See also Dombroff, supra note 58, at 229-30; Howe, supra note 82, at
646-54 (detailing the procedures followed by the government regarding regulation of
air safety matters). Cf Maready, Liability of the United States for Unwarranted Certification
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craft litigation 9 as an original or third-party defendant. 9'
The question of whether the aircraft was properly certified
raises the same issues of government liability and exemption
discussed in Neustadt.92
Case law supports the view of one observer that "with re-
spect to certification of aircraft engines and other compo-
nents . . . the misrepresentation exception defense appears to
be the most difficult one to overcome in a negligent certifica-
tion case against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act." '93 While the personal/commercial distinction
has been of little value in aviation cases,94 the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect injury has been used by the
courts.95 In Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc.,96 the plaintiff claimed
economic loss resulting from its purchase of an aircraft which
was not in the condition represented by the defendant
seller.97 In addition to breach of express and implied warran-
ties, the plaintiff grounded its complaint on fraudulent mis-
ofAircraf- The View of the Manufacturer, 11 FORUM 558 (1976) (describing the "partner-
ship" between manufacturer and government in air-related certification matters).
- See Kennelly, Claims and Suts for Aviation Accidents Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
1972 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1.
q, See Kennelly, The United States in Third-Party Actions i Certifcation Cases, 17 FORUM
556 (1982). But cf. Stencel Aero Eng'g v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (indicating
the existence of some limits on such actions).
12 See United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 43-56. An integral but still evolving aspect of the liability ques-
tion is the crashworthiness doctrine. For a general discussion of the doctrine as it per-
tains to aircraft, see Saba, Aircraft Crashworthiness in the United States.- Some Legal and
Technical Parameters, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 287 (1983).
- Tompkins, supra note 89, at 600. See infa text accompanying notes 96-132. Re-
garding the discretionary function exception, some further light should be shed on its
use when the Supreme Court decides United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d
1209 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983), and its companion case, S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (V.A.R.I.G. Airlines) v. United States, 692
F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
' See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
Ir' Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931
(1967); United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964); Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afdon
other grounds sub nom., Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968).
306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
9, Id. at 856.
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representation.98  Planes, Inc. then filed a third-party
complaint against the United States on the ground that it
relied on a certification of airworthiness made by the FAA in
making its own representations to the plaintiff.99 The com-
pany claimed that the FAA inspector negligently inspected
and certified the aircraft, if in fact the plane was found not to
be airworthy.10
The court recognized that the mere presence of an element
of misrepresentation was insufficient to invoke the misrepre-
sentation exception regarding the government's liability.' 10
The court's analysis was similar to that in Cross Brothers Meat
Packers"°2 regarding the direct versus incidental nature of the
alleged negligent conduct of the government.0 3 In a well-
reasoned opinion, the court discussed the limited utility of the
distinction between claims for personal injury and those for
economic or financial loss arising from the footnote comment
in Neustadt.' 4 Instead the court declared the key inquiry to
be whether "the cause of action arose directly from reliance
on the communication of certain erroneous facts arrived at
through negligent means." 105
The court then turned its attention to the facts in the case
before it.' 06 The court decided that the third-party plaintiff
was complaining of the FAA's misrepresentation regarding
the aircraft's condition which it relied upon in making its
own representations to the buyer.'0 7 The negligent inspection
by the FAA was merely secondary,' 08 because Planes, Inc.
sought no recovery for "direct injuries flowing from the negli-
gent inspection.'" 0 9 Thus, the misrepresentation exception
- Id at 856-57.
- Id at 857.
Im Id
10, Id at 858.
112 See Cross Brothers Meat Packers v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Pa.
1982), disacssedsupra in text accompanying notes 69-74.
103 Manval, 306 F. Supp. at 858.
- Id See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Man'val, 306 F. Supp. at 858.
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exempted the government from liability."'
The opposite result was reached in In re Air Crash Disaster
near Silver Plume."' Plaintiffs there sought recovery from the
United States for injuries and deaths resulting from the crash
of an aircraft." 2 Among their various contentions, plaintiffs
alleged that an inspector for the FAA negligently inspected
and certified the aircraft in question as airworthy when it was
in fact unfit to fly, thus proximately causing plaintiffs' dam-
ages.'1 3 The United States raised the misrepresentation de-
fense as a bar to plaintiffs' actions." 4 After a thorough review
of relevant case law, the court attempted to "synthesize the
criteria necessary for successful recovery under the Tort
Claims Act."' 15
First, the court noted that the Federal Aviation Act of
1958'16 clearly established that the primary purpose of the
Act revolved around the defendant's duty to promote safety
through inspection and certification of planes." 7 Secondly,
the court reasoned that the passengers were the intended ben-
eficiaries of such a duty."' The court sustained plaintiffs'
pleading as stating a good cause of action and refused to ap-
ply the misrepresentation exception in a summary fashion as
other courts had done in cases where operational malfunc-
tions by the government involved communications in some
form." 9 The court held that negligently-performed inspec-
..o Id
'" 445 F. Supp. 384 (D. Kan. 1977).
,,2 Id at 387.
11: Id
114 Id.
-, Id at 408. The court indicated that two requirements must be met: (1) there
must be an actionable duty to plaintiff or his class by statute or regulation whose pri-
mary purpose is to protect them from danger which might flow directly out of such
duty, and (2) negligent conduct of a government employee at an operational level must
be the proximate cause of any injury alleged. Id
49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1423 (1976).
445 F. Supp. at 409. But cf Howe, supra note 82, at 645-46, 655 (attempting to
clarify the true nature of the inspection and certification program undertaken by the
government).
"" 445 F. Supp. at 409.
,,9 Id See, e.g., Cross Bros. Meat Packers v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), dzscacsedsupra in text accompanying notes 69-74; Marival, Inc. v. Planes Inc.
306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 96-110.
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tions which fail to reveal defects and are relied upon by
others may be the proximate cause of any injury to a passen-
ger involved in a crash caused by the defect. 20 In the words
of the court, "[t]he certification is a reporting of results of
such inspection but was not in itself relied upon by plaintiffs
.. . 12 Since the plaintiffs' claims arose from their reli-
ance on the negligent inspection itself, the misrepresentation
exception could not be used by the government to bar their
recovery. 12
2
While shying away from Silver Plume's formal analysis,
23
the court in SA. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(VA.R.I G. Airhnes) v. United States 24 refused to recognize the
applicability of the misrepresentation exception in an airline
crash which left 124 persons dead. 25  The designs, plans,
specifications and performance data of the manufacturer,
Boeing Aircraft, had been inspected and certified as accepta-
ble by the FAA.' 2 6 Having made clear its recognition of an
action against the government in negligent inspection and
certification cases, the VA.R.IG. court discussed the defenses
raised by the government. 27 With respect to the misrepre-
sentation exemption, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims
arose from the negligent inspection rather than any misrepre-
sentation which followed in the form of a final certificate that
merely reported the results of such inspection. 28 In a bold
decision going against the trend of authority, the court held
that the misrepresentation defense could not be invoked by
the government.' 29 The court cited the Neal decision from
the Sixth Circuit, upon which certiorari had already been
- 445 F. Supp. at 409. However, the court was unable to find sufficient evidence to
establish proximate cause, thereby precluding recovery by the plaintiffs. Id at 410.
,2, Id. at 409.
1-2 Id
'12 See supra text accompanying notes 111-122.
,24 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
125 Id at 1207-08.
126 Id. at 1207.
127 Id.
,2R Id at 1208.
129 Id.
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granted by the Supreme Court. 130  Certiorari was also
granted in VA.R.IG., 13' but only after the Supreme Court
reached its decision in Block v. Neal.132
II. A SECOND LOOK AT THE MISREPRESENTATION
EXCEPTION: BLOCK v NEAL
In Block v. Neal,'3 3 the Supreme Court reviewed the Sixth
Circuit's holding134 that the district court erred in dismissing
Mrs. Neal's negligence claim. 135 The Court of Appeals relied
on the Good Samaritan doctrine136 of tort law to provide the
duty which the trial court failed to find. 37  The court cited
-*' Id
uil S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (V.A.R.I.G. Airlines) v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983).
Id
134 Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id at 1092.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). The Good Samaritan doc-
trine is described as follows.
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services. One who undertakes,
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recog-
nize as necessagfor the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for physical harm resultingfrom failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id. Where third persons are involved, the applicable provision appears in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). It provides:
Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking. One who un-
dertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to habtiity to the third person for physical harm resultigfrom his falure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking If
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the thirdperson upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
':" Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1981). The issue of whether
the Rural Housing Loan Program imposed certain duties on the government was ex-
tensively briefed by the parties and addressed by the court of appeals. Id The fact that
the court found a voluntary undertaking by the government, however, limited its reli-
ance on any such statutory duties. Id The government had argued that no such duties
existed, regardless of the specific statutory scheme involved. Id at 1184. The govern-
ment's argument was based on its reading of the most definitive case to date relating to
the misrepresentation exception, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961). Id
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substantial precedent extending the applicability of the doc-
trine to the government where it performed a voluntary un-
dertaking in a negligent manner. 3 " The court recognized
that the exceptions to the FTCA preserve sovereign immu-
nity in certain instances and focused on the misrepresentation
defense raised by the government. 39 In the view of the Sixth
Circuit,' 4° a determination needed to be made as to the true
basis for the plaintiff's claim.' 4 ' Mrs. Neal based her com-
plaint on the government's failure to use due care in the vol-
untary undertaking of inspecting and supervising the
construction of her house rather than on any misrepresenta-
tion related to such undertaking. 4 2 The appellate court held,
The court hinted, however, that a statute may give rise to an actionable duty where
Congress intended such a result. Regarding the particular legislation before it, the
court stated, "It is to be noted that Congress has specifically authorized FmHA to
provide technical assistance and supervision of construction." Id at 1181. For one
commentator's view of the relationship between a duty within a statutory scheme and
a determination of government liability, see Tompkins, supra note 89, at 597-98.
-" Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1981). Some of the cases that the
court cited in which government liability was established were: Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (government negligence in its attempts to control
and extinguish a forest fire); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)
(government negligence in the maintenance of a light house beacon lamp); Seaboard
Coast Line R. R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (government negli-
gence in the design and construction of a drainage ditch along a railroad route); Ing-
ham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967)
(government liable for its negligence in operation of the national air traffic control
system); and Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Hawaii 1979) (govern-
ment negligence in failing to require a subcontractor to comply with a contract's safety
requirements).
,39 Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1981). The Federal Torts Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(h) Any claim arising out of. . . misrepresentation, deceit, or interfer-
ence with contract rights . ...
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
-" The court had little difficulty distinguishing United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S.
696 (1961), an early Supreme Court opinion interpreting the misrepresentation excep-
tion, notwithstanding a remarkable factual similarity in the facts to NeaZ See supra text
accompanying notes 43-56 for a discussion of United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696
(1961).
.4 Neal v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1981).
142 Id at 1184. In a footnote, the court noted its difference of opinion with the Tenth
Circuit which had recently reached the opposite conclusion in Reynolds v. United
States, 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. ), cert. demed, 454 U.S. 817 (1981). The court suggested
that the difference might be explained by Reynold's failure to claim that his damages
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therefore, that the misrepresentation exception did not bar
her cause of action. 143
The interest of the Supreme Court in providing greater
elaboration on the specific question dealing with the scope of
the misrepresentation exception 144 is underscored by its insis-
tence on clarifying what questions were not before the
Court. 145 The Court reviewed the Neustadt opinion delivered
some twenty-two years earlier. 146 Neustadt stood for the prop-
osition that the misrepresentation exception protects the gov-
ernment from liability for pecuniary injuries which are
"wholly attributable" to the plaintiff's reliance on negligent
were the direct result of a negligent inspection. The court indicated tactfully that the
Tenth Circuit also took a different view from it regarding the intent and purpose of the
Fair Housing Act. Id at 1184 n.7.
": Id at 1184. It is interesting to note that later the Sixth Circuit bypassed the
misrepresentation issue when confronted with it in the context of the FAA's negligent
certification of a Cessna 177 for airworthiness. Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d
1061 (6th Cir. 1981). In Garbarino, the court considered two aspects of the negligent
certification issue: whether the government could be held liable either for its decision
to delegate inspection duties to an inspection department of the manufacturer or for
the subsequent negligent inspection conducted by that department. Id. at 1065-66.
With respect to the first aspect, the court held that any suit on such grounds was
barred by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA without reaching the
question of the applicability of the misrepresentation exception. Id at 1065. With
respect to the second aspect, the court explained that neither exception applied; rather
the government simply could not be liable for the acts of another under a theory of
respondeat superior. Id at 1066. The court went on to specify that its holding was
supported by policy considerations as well, since any other decision would "make the
Government a joint insurer of all activity subject to safety inspection." Id
- A split existed between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits on this question at the time
of the decision. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Also, an amicus curiae brief
had been filed in support of Ms. Neal by the Oregon Legal Services Corporation on
behalf of the plaintiff in Park v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 970 (D. Or. 1981) which
was, at the time, on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, and also involved an FmHA inspec-
tion. Id at 971.
",, 103 S. Ct. at 1092. The Court indicated that several issues were beyond the scope
of the opinion: whether the Good Samaritan doctrine was encompassed within the
plaintiff's claim for negligence, whether the discretionary function exception applied to
the facts before it, and whether the administrative remedies of the Housing Act were
exclusive or contained an alternative basis for plaintiffs claim. Id. The government's
brief narrowed the question to the applicability of the misrepresentation exception.
Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1098 (1983). Attorneys for Ms.
Neal raised the duty issue as well as the question regarding the misrepresentation ex-
ception. Brief for the Respondent at 1, Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1098 (1983).
'1 103 S. Ct. at 1093. See supra text accompanying notes 43-56 for a discussion of
United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
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misrepresentation.147 A misrepresentation claim, however,
requires not only communication of information, but also re-
liance on such information by the aggrieved party.'48 The
Court recognized that some overlap exists between such an
action and one sounding in negligence, but found nothing in
the history or language of the FTCA which would bar an
action arising out of certain aspects of the government's con-
duct even though distinct claims arising out of other aspects
are not actionable.' 49 The Court refused to add anything fur-
ther to the scope of the exception beyond the plain meaning
of the statute. 50 The Court feared that to do so would per-
mit artful pleading to defeat the general purpose of the
statute. 5'
The Court then sifted through the underlying claims raised
under the facts of the case before it.' 5 2 The plaintiff was seek-
ing to recover damages from the United States for the breach
of its duty to use due care to ensure that the builder comply
with previously approved plans and to cure defects prior to
completion of the construction.' 53 The Court recognized that
an aspect of such negligence could be said to encompass mis-
statements made by the FmHA.'54 While the agency had a
duty to exercise care in its communications, the plaintiff did
not base her complaint on a breach of that particular duty."'
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's analysis in VA.R..G,' 56 the
Supreme Court looked at the relationship between the con-
duct at the core of plaintiff's complaint and the injury al-
leged. 157 In so doing, it had no difficulty distinguishing the
,,, 103 S. Ct. at 1093-94.
148 Id







692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), dircussedsupra in text accompanying notes 124-133.
,, 103 S. Ct. at 1094. The court in VARI G., like the Nea/ Court, focused on the
fact that the plaintiff's claims arose from the negligence of the inspection rather than
from any subsequent misrepresentation contained in the certificates issued by the FAA.
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facts in Neustadt.158 There the plaintiff had in fact been mis-
led by a government appraisal and claimed "no injury that
he would have suffered independently of his reliance on the
erroneous appraisal. 1 59  The duty breached in Neustadt,
therefore, was that of using due care in communicating infor-
mation to the buyer.' 6° In contrast, the buyer in Neal was
alleging a breach of FmHA's duty to use due care to ensure
that the builder adhere to approved plans and to cure all de-
fects before completing construction. 61 In the words of the
Neal Court, "the Government's misstatements are not essen-
tial to plaintiff's negligence claim.'
' 62
The Court conceded that Mrs. Neal's negligence claim in-
cluded an element of reliance which is an essential aspect of
misrepresentation. 163 The Court, however, pointed to the
language in Neustadt which recognized that many types of
negligent conduct "involve an element of 'misrepresentation,'
in the generic sense of that word.' 1 64 Thus the Sixth Circuit
had indeed been correct in its determination that Mrs. Neal
claimed no injury arising from a government misrepresenta-
tion and was not barred from seeking recovery under the
FTCA. 165
III. CONCLUSION
The significance of the Neal decision lies in the Court's in-
clination to construe in a strict manner one of the two most
widely-raised defenses to the broad liability created by the
FTCA. 66 In airline certification cases, in particular, the re-
S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (V.A.R.I.G. Airlines) v. United States,
692 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
ma 103 S. Ct. at 1095. See supra text accompanying notes 43-56, for a discussion of
United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
103 S. Ct. at 1093.
SId
Id at 1094-95.
2 Id at 1094.
Id
Id at 1093 n.7.
Id at 1094-95.
" The court quoted from United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 388 U.S. 366, 383
(1949): "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where
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cent trend has been to shut off any route to recovery from the
United States, often through the summary judgment device
or the granting of motions to dismiss. 67 Plaintiffs have been
given a boost, however, through the Neal decision. Neal has
also laid the groundwork for affirmance of VA.R. .'68 Neal
and VA.R.IC. permit plaintiffs an opportunity to go to trial
with facts which may establish a claim grounded on negligent
action even though such facts may appear inextricably woven
into a misrepresentation claim. '169
Moreover, there is notably absent from the Neal opinion
any reference to the policy arguments raised by the govern-
ment to the effect that it should not be made an insurer of the
conduct of private industry. 7 ' As was the case in VA.R..G.,
the Supreme Court was more concerned that the government
not be permitted to shield itself entirely from tort liability by
simply raising the misrepresentation defense where some
form of communication was involved.' Certainly this posi-
tion has support in the legislative history. 7 2 While both Neal
and VA.R.G broaden the scope of potential liability of the
FAA, 7 3 the plaintiff is still limited by the law of the state in
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction
where consent has been announced." 103 S. Ct. at 1094.
,- Such motions have been used often by the government where it raises one of the
"exception" defenses to allegations of liability. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68,
78-110. See, e.g., Knudsen v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment granted since plaintiff's claim regarding negli-
gent inspection barred by misrepresentation exception); Summers v. United States, 480
F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1979) (government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted approved by court because action grounded on air-
worthiness certificate barred by misrepresentation exception); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft,
429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction granted because of misrepresentation exception barring manufac-
turer's third-party action against the United States); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 306
F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (government's motion to dismiss granted because of
misrepresentation exception), dzrcussed supra in text accompanying notes 96-110.
- S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (V.A.R.I.C. Airlines) v. United
States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983), dlscussedsupra
in text accompanying notes 124-131.
, See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
,o 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983). See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
... 103 S. Ct. at 1091.
,12 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
173 The government included this argument in its briefs to the NealCourt. See, e.g.,
Brief for the Petitioners at 27-28, Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983).
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which the federal court sits' 74 and, particularly in crash cases,
by such formidable obstacles as the establishment of proxi-
mate causation.175  In addition, the government's liability
often will not be shouldered alone.
76
As in the Neustadt opinion, the notion that negligent mis-
representation often arises in an economic context was men-
tioned in a footnote in Neal.'77 The Neal Court otherwise
bypassed the old economic/personal injury distinction which
had been used by the lower courts. 78 Because of the facts in
Neal, it may well be that such a distinction has little, if any,
continued significance, since plaintiff there sought recovery of
an economic nature.
179
Neal makes clear, however, that courts must continue to
struggle with the slippery, often subtle, distinction between
those pleadings which serve merely as a guise for actions aris-
, See supra note 32. See also Perez v. United States, 368 F.2d 320 (1st Cir. 1966)
(ordinary tort rule that servant is not engaged in his master's work when traveling
between home and work would be applied by federal court when the state where in-
jury occurred had not specifically rejected rule); Walton v. United States, 484 F. Supp.
568 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (federal government liability when negligence occurred through
independent contractor); Vandergrift v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va.
1978) (Virginia wrongful death statute applies in wrongful death action against United
States to determine liability); Lloyd v. Cessna,.434 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (local
jurisdiction's rules on choice of law govern); Robinson v. United States, 408 F. Supp.
132 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (state law governs on validity of a release); Frazier v. Nabors, 273
F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), rev don other grounds, 412 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1969) (law of
place where accident occurs governs in determining whether federal employee was act-
ing within scope of employment).
11r, See supra note 120 and accompanying text. The obstacle has been significant, as
can be seen by the fact that several of the plaintiffs successful on the exemption issue
have proceeded only to fail on the proximate cause issue. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United
States, 600 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause). But
seealso Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aft'don other grounds
sub nom. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), lert. denied, 393 U.S. 979
(1968) (where plaintiff successfully established liability, including the element of proxi-
mate cause).
,7. As pointed out in Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 11, Block v. Neal, 103 S.
Ct. 1089 (1983), the impact of the government's liability may be minimized by the
availability of a cross-claim against a joint tortfeasor, such as the contractor in Neal or
a manufacturer in airline certification cases. Agencies may also seek to protect them-
selves through the establishment of a bond or escrow account. In the Nealcase, a setoff
could also be claimed. Id
" Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089, 1093 n.5 (1983).
- Id. See supra notes 59-61.
179 Id. at 1090-91.
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ing from negligent misrepresentations and those whose facts
raise a distinct claim arising from the government's negligent
conduct.' Their deliberations must necessarily include a
close scrutiny of the facts before them, including the nature
and extent of government involvement in the area in ques-
tion. In Block v. Neal, the Court has reinforced its position
that it will not extend the shield of sovereign immunity more
broadly than has been directed by Congress. 8 ' This may en-
courage agencies to exercise more carefully their inspection
and supervisory responsibilities. 8 2 It also permits the plain-
tiff a day in court which might otherwise be denied.'83
Sarah Saldana DesRochers
Id. at 1093-94.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
': See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
TORTS-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE TO
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY-A supplier of military equip-
ment is not subject to strict products liability for a design de-
fect where: (1) the United States is immune from liability; (2)
the supplier proves that the United States established or ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly de-
fective military equipment; (3) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (4) the supplier warned the United
States about patent errors in the government's specifications
or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States. Mc-
Kay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
dene'd, 104 S. Ct. 711 (1984).
On August 13, 1974, Navy Lieutenant Commander Mal-
colm W. McKay' was assigned to fly a night training mission
in an RA-5C,2 an aircraft manufactured by Rockwell Inter-
national, Inc. (Rockwell).' During this mission, the aircraft
caught fire,4 forcing Commander McKay and his navigator
to eject.5 The ejection system functioned properly. 6 The nav-
Lieutenant Commander McKay had twelve years of experience as a pilot. He had
accummulated over 2,000 hours of flight time and had served a tour of duty in Viet-
nam. He was undergoing refresher training in the RA-5C at Key West, Florida when
the accident occurred. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. CV 75-3672-DWW (C.D.
Cal. March 30, 1981), reprinted in Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee at A4, McKay
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereafter cited as District C. Op.,
Opening BriefofDefendant/Appellee].
In the mid 1950's, Rockwell, while under contract with the Navy, began develop-
ing an aircraft capable of flying at altitudes of up to 75,000 feet and with a potential
speed of two and one-half times the speed of sound. This aircraft was designated the
A-5A. It was designed to be a supersonic carrier-based attack bomber with a crew of
two. Id. at AI-A2. In the early 1960's, the Navy decided to redesign the aircraft as a
supersonic carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft designated the RA-5C "Vigilante."
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1983).
fMcKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 446.
4Id
District Ct. Op., Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee, supra note 1, at A4-A5.
Id. at A5.
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igator survived the ejection; Commander McKay did not.7
An autopsy revealed that the probable cause of death was
spinal cord injury, secondary to neck traumatism.'
Some five months before the McKay accident, on March 5,
1974, Navy Lieutenant Frank Carson 9 had encountered a
similar fate.'° While on a similar training mission, he and his
navigator also ejected from a burning RA-5C." Once again,
the navigator survived while the pilot, Lieutenant Carson,
did not.' 2 The autopsy surgeon concluded that the probable
cause of Lieutenant Carson's death was a contusion of the
spinal cord.' 3 The autopsies following both accidents re-
vealed that the pilots' deaths were probably caused during
ejection.14
The escape system on both RA-5C aircraft in these acci-
dents was the HS-1A, a modified version of an earlier escape
system' 5 used in RA-5C aircraft.16  Upon deployment the
HS-1A system shed the canopy which covered the two crew-
men, physically restrained them in their seats in a fetal posi-
tion, with the exception of the head, and then ballistically
ejected them by rocket thrust into the airstream. 17 Both par-
ties agreed with the expert witnesses that the injuries to the
pilots occurred just as the "head/helmet/neck mass" entered
7Id
a Id
I Lieutenant Carson was a pilot with eight years of experience, including combat
duty in Southeast Asia and Vietnam. At the time of the accident, he was stationed in




Id. The autopsy on Lieutenant Carson revealed an injury to the right lateral neck,
a fracture of the hyoid bone, and a broken neck. The navigator also suffered minor
injuries during the ejection. Id
" McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 446.
Ir, The earlier system, known as the FS-1 system, was capable of safely ejecting crew-
men at speeds from 90 to 750 knots and at altitudes up to 70,000 feet. The HS-IA, in
contrast, had a "zero-zero" low mode ejection system which could successfully eject
dummies placed in an aircraft that was not moving. District Ct. Op., Opening Bri'efof
Defendant/Appellee, supra note 1, at A9.
McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 446.
,7 Distrit Ct. Op., Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee, supra note 1, at A9. The ejection
system was designed to be initiated by the pilot sitting in the front seat. The navigator
was first ejected, then the pilot. Id
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the airstream, 8 and the unrestrained head/helmet was forced
back against the seat.19
The widows of both Navy pilots filed wrongful death ac-
tions against Rockwell in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.20 They alleged defective
design of the aircraft and of the ejection system.' The cases
were consolidated for trial with the district court determining
that it had admiralty jurisdiction under the Death on the
High Seas Act.22 The court found that Rockwell was liable
for the design defects of the HS-1A escape system under the
principles of tort law set forth in sections 388,23 389,24 and
m Opening Brief of Appellants at 9-10, McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d
444 (9th Cir. 1983).
,1 Compare Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee at 4, McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that both parties agreed as to the cause of
the descendants' incapacitation) with Opening Brief of Appellants at 10, McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing with approval the testimony
of Rockwell's expert pathologist).
- McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 446-47.
2, DisriCt C1. Op., Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee, supra note 1, at Al.
22 McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 447. The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1976), provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any state. . . the personal representative of the decedant may
maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in
admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedant's wife . . . against
the vessel, person or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). The district court concluded that the deaths had occurred
beyond one marine league from shore and therefore based jurisdiction exclusively in
admiralty. District C. Op., Opening Bn'ef of Defendant/Appellee, supra note 1, at Al.
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (imposing liability for physi-
cal harm upon a supplier of a chattel who has reason to know that the chattel is dan-
gerous for the use for which it is supplied, has no reason to believe that the users will
realize the dangerous condition, and fails to inform the users of its dangerous condi-
tion). The Ninth Circuit found there was no reason for Rockwell to believe that the
Navy, the user, was unaware of the potentially "dangerous condition" of the ejection
system. McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 454.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 389 (1965) (imposing liability for physi-
cal harm upon a supplier having reason to know that the chattel supplied is unlikely to
be made reasonably safe before put to its expected use although the user is informed of
the chattel's dangerous character). The Ninth Circuit interpreted section 389 as apply-
ing to a chattel which is not reasonably safe. The court pointed out that the Navy's
post-accident study found that the ejection system was reasonably safe, and the Navy
accordingly continued its use. McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 455.
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402A 25 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 26  The court,
however, found no liability under the same principles of tort
law for the design of the RA-5C aircraft itself.27 Judgment
was rendered after a trial in favor of plaintiffs Carson and
McKay for a total of $711,553.28 Carson and McKay ap-
pealed the measure and amount of damages awarded in their
respective judgments to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 9
Rockwell appealed on the grounds that military suppliers
should not be liable to servicemen for injuries caused by de-
fective military hardware ° Held, reversed and remanded. A sup-
plier of military equipment is not subject to strict products
liability for a design defect where: (1) the United States is
immune from liability; (2) the supplier proves that the
United States established or approved reasonably precise
specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment;
(3) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (4)
the supplier warned the United States about patent errors in
the government's specifications or about dangers involved in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 104 S.Ct. 711 (1984).
2 Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Governmental Immunity and the Feres-Stencel Doctrine
The English common law doctrine of sovereign immunity,
premised upon the belief that allowing the King to be sued in
his own courts was a contradiction of his sovereignty, 31 pre-
cluded any suit from being brought against the King, or his
officers,32 without his consent.3 Early in American legal his-
tory, Chief Justice Marshall grafted sovereign immunity into
this nation's constitutional system, 34 without citation of au-
thority or explanation,35 in a case that did not turn on this
doctrine.3 6 As a corollary to the rule of sovereign immunity,
the Supreme Court has since recognized that any waiver of
the immunity must come through Congress.37
Congress finally waived immunity for tort claims with the
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)31 in 1946.31
The FTCA extended a remedy to those who previously had
3' W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971).
12 Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Ofers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9
(1963).
- I L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 51 at 2-4 (1984).
m See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 411-12 (1821) (extending the
United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions to criminal judgments in a
case involving the sale of lottery tickets, which was illegal in Virginia).
31 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. at 411-12. Recently, however, one court has given
this justification for the theory:
If a [governing body] is to do the job of governing well, then there is
something to be said for withholding the threat of answerability in dam-
ages for at least some of the actions and decisions which governing neces-
sarily entails. He who rules must make choices among competing courses
of action and in the face of conflicting considerations of policy. The ca-
pacity and the incentive to govern effectively are arguably not enhanced
by the prospect of being sued by those citizens who may be adversely
affected by the choice eventually made. Thus it has been thought wise
to sweep this restrictive cloud from the horizon and to let those responsi-
ble for the conduct of public affairs calculate their courses of action free
of this intimidating influence.
Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
- Note, Jaffee v. United States.- Feres Doctrine at the Clifs Edge?, 42 U. PITr. L. REV.
115, 116 n.5 (1980).
" See I L. JAYSON, supra note 33, § 51 at 2-4 & n.10.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1976).
39 See I L. JAYSON, supra note 33, § 51 at 2-3-2-4, for a summary of the rather
unique events leading up to the passage of the FTCA.
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none.40 The sovereign thereafter consented to be sued for its
wrongs where a private person would have been liable under
like circumstances.41 Likewise, the FTCA required applica-
tion of local law to such actions.42
The FTCA, however, did not completely abrogate sover-
eign immunity. 43 Congress created several exceptions from
its waiver of immunity." One of the exceptions excludes lia-
bility for any claim arising out of "combatant activities" dur-
ing the time of war.45
In Feres v. United States,46 the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether a serviceman who sustained an injury in-
cident to service, which would have been an actionable
wrong in a private suit, was excluded from recovery under
the "combatant activities" exception to the FTCA.47  Three
cases were considered in the opinion.48 Common to all was
the fact that each claimant was on active duty, not on fur-
lough, and was injured by the negligence of others in the
armed forces.49 Two federal courts of appeal had held that
- Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
4, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). This section states in part: "The United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." Id.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1976).
44 Id.
4 Id. § 2680(0) (excluding "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"). The exceptions
most likely to be of significance to military activities are those which retain immunity
for claims based upon a government employee's performance or failure to perform a
discretionary function, claims arising out of combatant activities of the military and
claims arising in a foreign country. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (j), (k) (1976).
- 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4' Id at 138.
48 Id. at 136-37. The three cases considered in the opinion were: Feres v. United
States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949) (a wrongful death claim against the government for
negligently housing the deceased in a barracks which burned because of a defective
heater); Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949) (a malpractice action
against the United States where an army surgeon left a towel in the plaintiff's abdo-
men); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) (a negligence claim based
upon unskilled medical treatment by Army surgeons).
49 Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
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the "combatant activites" exception barred the claims 5° while
one held that it did not.5' In resolving the split of opinion,
the Supreme Court construed the "combatant activities" ex-
ception to the FTCA as retaining immunity from liability for
injuries to servicemen arising out of, or in the course of, activ-
ity incident to service.5" Hence, the Court denied recovery
against the government in each case.5
The holding in Feres dealt only with suits by servicemen
against the government.54 The Court did not consider
whether the government was also immune from liability
when a member of the Armed Forces brought a tort action
against a private defendant who, in turn, sought indemnity55
from the government.56 This question was addressed in
Stencel Aero Engneerh'g Corp. v. United States.57 In Stencel, a mili-
tary pilot claimed permanent injuries resulting from the fail-
ure of his life support system during ejection from his
aircraft.58 The pilot brought an action to recover damages
for his injuries from the Stencel Corporation, the manufac-
turer of the system. 9 Stencel cross-claimed against the
United States for total indemnity.60 The federal district court
r4 See Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949); Jefferson v. United States,
178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
See Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
Id Cf United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (allowing recovery to a
discharged serviceman for injuries sustained while he was not on active duty or subject
to military discipline); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949) (allowing
recovery to a serviceman whose injuries due to the negligence of government employ-
ees were not sustained incident to service).
- Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765, 774 (8th Cir. 1976) (an appeal from the
dismissal of a cross-claim against the United States by a miltary contractor sued by a
serviceman injured on duty), afd sub nora, Stencel Aero Eng. Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666 (1977).
55 Indemnity is a right inuring to a person secondarily liable who has discharged his
obligation to the injured party to seek compensation from the one who is primarily
liable. 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 1 (1968).
% Donham, 536 F.2d at 774. As a result of the Supreme Court's failure to consider
this question, a split of opinion arose among the circuits. Stencel Aero Eng. Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 669 n.6 (1977).
7 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
'" Donham, 536 F.2d at 767.
59 I.
- M.
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dismissed the cross-claim and the court of appeals affirmed.61
The Supreme Court also affirmed the dismissal of the cross-
claim,6 2 holding that the right of a private third party to re-
cover indemnity against the United States is unavailable
where Feres would preclude a direct action by servicemen.63
The immunity recognized in Feres and extended in Stencel is
predicated upon three common principles. 64 The Court con-
cluded, first, that the relationship between the government,
its suppliers, and the members of the Armed Forces is distinc-
tively federal in character, 65 and accordingly, that liability
should not be determined by the disparate local law as re-
quired by the FTCA.66 Second, through the Veterans Benefit
Act,67 the United States has limited its liability in an area in
which it has broad exposure while providing an efficient, uni-
form compensation scheme for injured servicemen.68 Permit-
ting claims either by servicemen or third parties would, in the
,, Id at 767, 775.
62 Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674.
w, Id at 673-74. The court of appeals stated that Stencel alleged that the ejection
system was manufactured according to government specifications and that Stencel had
cited several cases which suggested that such compliance might constitute a defense to
the claims against it. The court, however, said the question was not addressed in this
case. Donham, 536 F.2d at 768 & 768 n.2. The Supreme Court, although not explicitly
addressing this question, stated that the denial of indemnity was not unfair to Stencel,
who could take the possibility of liability into account when negotiating contracts with
the government. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674 & n.8.
- Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671.
- See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671 (where the Court determined that a "distinctively fed-
eral" relationship exists between the government and its suppliers as well as members
of the Armed Forces). See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)
(discussing the relationship between the government and members of the Armed
Forces) cted in Fees, 340 U.S. at 143.
' See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Wartime disability compensation is provided for in 38 U.S.C. §§ 310-315 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The basic rates range from $62 per month for a 10% disability to
$1,213 per month for total disability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 314 (West Supp. 1983). Addi-
tional amounts are provided for dependents. 38 U.S.C. § 315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Wartime death compensation is provided for in 38 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1976) (the
monthly rate for a surviving spouse with no children is $87).
Other service-connected deaths are provided for in 38 U.S.C. §§ 401-417 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The monthly compensation for a surviving spouse varies, depending
upon pay grade from $445 for grade E-I to $1,391 for grade 0-10. 38 U.S.C.A. § 411
(West Supp. 1983).
- Sencel, 431 U.S. at 672-73; Fees 340 U.S. at 144-45.
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Court's opinion, circumvent this limitation. 69 Third, litiga-
tion to determine the degree of fault by government agents
and testimony of members of the armed forces as to each
other's decisions and actions would have an undesirable effect
upon military discipline,7 ° regardless of whether such suits
were brought by a soldier or a third party.71
B. The Government Contractor Defense
The protective cloak of sovereign immunity was extended
beyond government officials to those acting contractually on
behalf of the government in the seminal opinion of Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Constructin Co.72 The Supreme Court recognized
in Yearsley that the immunity of the federal government73
could provide a defense to liability for private contractors in
the government's employ.74 The contractor in Yearsley, while
duly authorized and directed by the government, 75 had di-
verted the flow of the Missouri River in an effort to improve
its navigable capacity. 76 The plaintiff brought an inverse
condemnation action against the contractor, alleging the di-
version had caused the erosion and loss of ninety-five acres of
his land.7 7 Both the district court and the court of appeals
determined that the contractor alone could be held responsi-
ble for the damage, even though he was acting under the di-
rection of the United States Government. 78  The Supreme
Court, however, held to the contrary, stating that as long as
- Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
70 Id; United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); see generally Feres, 340 U.S. at
141-43.
7, Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has added that an-
other fundamental reason for the Feres-Stencel doctrine is the need for governmental
immunity from the results of errors in military judgment. See Hale v. United States,
416 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969).
72 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
7: Id at 20-23. This is apparently the only case where a form of shared immunity for
federal contractors has been recognized by the Supreme Court. Note, Liabiity of a
Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1025, 1049
(1982).
" Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. at 20.
7, Id.
76 Id at 19.
7 Id at 20.
78 See W.A. Ross Constr. Co. v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 1939).
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the "authority to carry out the project was validly conferred,
that is, if what was done was done within the constitutional
power of Congress, there is no liability on the part of the con-
tractor for executing its will." 79 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court treated the contractor's relationship with the gov-
ernment as analogous to that of an agent or officer of the
government."' The Court further said that liability could
only exist where the authority of the contractor, if validly
conferred, had been exceeded.81
Under the government contractor defense, the contractor
in effect shares in the government's immunity for damage re-
sulting necessarily or incidentally from carrying out the con-
tract according to its terms.82 On a conceptual plane, this
defense is based upon general tort principles, 3 as well as pub-
lic policy,84 which favors extending immunity to those "who
79 Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20. Cf Lydecker v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 91 N.J.L.
622, 103 A. 251 (1918). Lydecker involved the performance of a contract with a county
to spread tar on a road. The county was negligent in setting the maximum specifica-
tions in the contract so that a sufficient amount of tar was spread to make the road
slippery. 103 A. at 252. The court recognized that the county was!immune from liabil-
ity but stated as a rule that a contractor would only be shielded from liability where
the method of performing the contract was not obviously or inherently dangerous. Id.
at 253.
- Yearsey, 309 U.S. at 2 1.
"' Id
02 Note, supra note 74, at 1032, 1051 nn. 134-36. But see Valley Forge Gardens, Inc. v.
James D. Morrissey, Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 123 A.2d 888 (1956). The court in Valley Forge
Gardens refused to extend the "immunity" of the state to private contractors. It instead
recognized a defense to liability based upon the "privilege" of being in privity of con-
tract with the state. Id at 891. The court went on to imply that the immunity of the
state would not be a factor in the applicability of this defense. Id at 892.
R3 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 793-94
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128
(1981). The "Agent Orange" court explained that tort liability principles seek to im-
pose liability on the wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the injury, providing
incentive to prevent the occurrence of future harm. The court reasoned that the deter-
rent effect of tort liability would not produce any societal benefit if the party suffering
liability is not in a position to correct the tortious act or omission. The court believed
that such is the position of a contractor whose only role in causing injury was the
"proper performance of a plan supplied by the government." Id
6 One of the policy factors in favor of extending freedom from liability is the preclu-
sion of the circumvention of government immunity. Government contractors would
presumably circumvent this immunity through increased contract prices to cover the
risk of any loss occassioned through compliance with governmental decisions. Dolphin
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965). In addition, the
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perform governmental contracts in accordance with their
specifications."85  Hence, one authority which specifically
considered the matter concluded that this defense is available
to a contractor only when the governmental unit with which
he contracts is immune from liablility. 86
In addition to the requirement of governmental immunity,
the case law following Yearsey has further expounded upon
the defense's limitations and application. In Merritt, Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Cuy F Atkinson Co.,87 the appellant contracted
with the government to construct a dam on the American
River in California.88 This contract required the construc-
tion of temporary dams above and below the permanent
dam site, with a diversion tunnel between the temporary
dams.89 The collapse of the upper temporary dam damaged
the appellee's construction work on the powerhouse installa-
tion.9 ° Litigation ensued,91 with the appellant claiming a
uncertainty as to the amount of damages might interfere with the government's ability
to secure contractors to undertake public works. See Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F.
Supp. 1263, 1266 (E:D. Tenn. 1973); Valley Forge Gardens Inc. v. James D. Morrissey,
Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 123 A.2d 888, 891 (1956).
or, O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 188 n.1 (D. Vt. 1979), rev'don
other grounds, 573 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1978).
- Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aj'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
Similar to the government contractor defense is the defense available to independent
contractors against negligence actions. This defense originated in Ryan v. Feeney &
Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924). In Ryan the court held that a
contractor was justified in relying upon the plans and specifications he contracted to
follow "unless they are so apparently defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary
prudence would be put on notice that the work was dangerous and likely to cause
injury." Ryan, 145 N.E. at 321. The distinction between the government contractor
defense as historically applied and the defense originating in Ryan, known as the con-
tract specification defense, lies in the fact that the government contractor defense has
been available to insulate contractors from liability even though the specifications were
obviously dangerous. Note, supra note 74, at 1031. See, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803-04 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting that if the
defendant was a contractor of the government, as opposed to a private individual, the
defendant might be absolved of all liability when the government was immune), affd,
380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
- 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961).
" Id
-9 Id.
- Id. at 15.
", The plaintiff, Guy F. Atkinson Co., alleged negligence on two grounds respecting
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goverment contract defense 92 to avoid liability. 93
In rejecting the defense, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that
it was only applicable where the acts complained of were re-
quired by the contract.9 4 The contract in question was com-
pletely "silent as to details. ' 95 Thus, the court found there
was no "government directive" to do those acts charged
against the contractor as negligent. 6 It added "[that it
found] no evidence of government compulsion with respect
thereto. It is elementary that compulsion must exist before the
'government contract defense' is available."9 7 The court also
recognized as a general rule that the plans and specifications
must be drawn and adopted prior to the formation of the
contract98 and that if these conditions are satisfied, the parties
damaged must seek relief from the government, not the con-
construction of the temporary upstream dam. Three counts of negligence were alleged
concerning the supervision of the water level. Id. at 15-16.
11 The Ninth Circuit in Merritt phrased the defense in terms of the government "con-
tract" defense. See, e.g., Merrill, 295 F.2d at 15. Recently, however, the term govern-
ment "contractor" defense has been employed. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246
(3rd Cir. 1982).
9:, Merritt, 295 F.2d at 15-16.
.. Id.
9r, Id at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. (emphasis in original). Cf Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266
(E.D. Tenn. 1973) (holding that the defendant contractor was entitled to share in the
immunity of the United States because of the "high degree of control and supervision"
the Army exercised over the defendants manufacturing operations). See also Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 316-17 (9th Cir. 1961) (not addressing the gov-
ernment contractor defense, but refusing to find intervening negligence on the part of
the Air Force in failing to discover a design defect and order its correction, where
Boeing did not rely upon the Air Force inspections in its manufacturing process).
- Accord, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). O'Keefe in-
volved the crash of a B-52. The court determined that the negligence of Boeing in the
design and production of the aircraft had not been established. Although the court did
not explicitly address the government contractor defense, it stated that the govern-
ment's responsibility for the design of the bomber:
"neither exonerates the defendant, nor has it in any way altered the de-
fendants duty as a manufacturer in this case where there has been no
showing that the defendant was totally oblivious of and/or aloof from
the genesis of the design specifications in the first place or that the speci-
fications represented either something less than the uppermost level of
the art or a compromise of safety."
Id at 1124 (court's footnotes omitted).
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tractor.99 The court said that an exception existed, however,
where the work was done in a careless or negligent manner."°°
Two years after Merritt, the Ninth Circuit again faced the
assertion of the government contractor defense in Myers v.
United States, 101 another construction case. The contractor in
Myers was constructing a public road through the plaintiffs'
lands. 10 2 The plaintiffs sued in trespass for acts done by the
contractor allegedly outside of the right of way of the United
States. 10 3 In holding that the contractor defense barred re-
covery, the court stated that to the extent the contractor ac-
ted in conformity with the terms of its contract, it would
suffer no liability.'0 4 On this occasion, the court made no
mention of the necessity of showing compulsion before one
could avail himself of the defense. 10 5 In fact, the court only
indicated that the defense would not be available when a
contractor acted "over and beyond" the terms of the con-
tract, or did not act in accordance therewith. 10 6
Although the government contractor defense was first rec-
ognized in cases involving construction projects, it has re-
cently been extended to cases involving military equipment
as well.0 7 For example, in Casablanca v. Casab'anca,'°8 a dough
Merritt, 295 F.2d at 16.
Id E.g., Green v. ICI America Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D. Tenn. 1973)
(applying Tennessee law which recognized that a government contractor is not liable
except when guilty of negligence in performing its work); Montgomery v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (stating that an intentional
omission of safety devices from the government contract could not give rise to liability
while negligent execution of the contract could); Valley Forge Gardens v. James D.
Morrissey, Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 123 A.2d 888, 891 (1956) (not shielding government con-
tractors from liability for negligent or wilful torts committed during the performance
of the contract). See supra text accompanying note 82.
- 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
'12 Id at 581.
01 Id at 581-82.
Id at 583. Accord, Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D.
Conn. 1963). The question presented in Dolphin Gardens was whether the contractor
could be held liable for the negligence of the government in failing to provide in the
contract certain safeguards to protect nearby property owners from the adverse effects
of dredging operations performed by the contractor. The court held that the contrac-
tor was not liable for the omission of the government. Id. at 827.
Myers, 323 F.2d at 583.
'0 Id See supra note 101.
Wo hen the government contractor defense has been applied to cases involving
684 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
mixer originally manufactured for the Army during World
War II injured an infant several years later while it was being
operated in a pizza shop.'0 9 The infant plaintiff brought suit
in a New York state court alleging faulty design as the cause
of his injuries." ° The trial court, therefore, faced the narrow
question of whether liability for design defects should be im-
posed upon the supplier of equipment to the Armed Forces
during the time of war.' Since the machine was manufac-
tured in accordance with governmental specifications, the
court determined as a matter of public policy 2 that no lia-
bility should be imposed." 3 The court stated that a supplier
of the military in the time of war should rely upon the gov-
ernment's specifications because a supplier could not with-
hold from the armed forces equipment it believed to be
imprudently or even dangerously designed." 4 Given these
unique circumstances, the court held that conformance to
contractual specifications was a complete defense to any ac-
tion based on defective design."'
Similarly, in Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.," 6 the plaintiff was
military equipment, additional policy factors supporting the defense have been ex-
pressed. See supra note 85 (outlining the basic policy factors underlying the defense). See
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), reo'd
on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). One
policy consideration the "Agent Orange" court saw as favoring the application of the
defense was the unfairness which could result if liability were imposed on manufactur-
ers of military equipment. The court pointed out that manufacturers could be com-
pelled by federal law to produce military equipment without the ability to negotiate
specifications, contract prices, or terms. The suppliers in such a situation would, ac-
cording to the court, face choosing between penalties for failure to supply war products
and potential liability for flaws in the government plans. Id. at 794.
- 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
- Casabianca, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
110 Id.
.. Id at 401-02.
'" See supra note 108.
Casabianca, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
114 Id.
Id But see Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969). The
Fifth Circuit refused to recognize the government contractor defense in Whitaker,
which involved injuries to a serviceman caused by a defective hand grenade. Id at
1012. The court determined that the defendant was "an independent contractor, sepa-
rate from the government" and not entitled to sovereign immunity. Id at 1015.
144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381
A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
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injured when he was thrown out of an Army jeep. 1 7 The
vehicle had been manufactured by Ford in accordance with
government engineering specifications and sold directly to
the United States Army." 8 The plaintiff alleged several de-
sign defects, but the only viable allegation against Ford was
that the jeep should have been manufactured with seat
belts. "9 The New Jersey trial court, in denying recovery for
the alleged design defect, held that reliance on a government
contract was a defense to claims of both negligence and strict
liability. 120
The Sanner court reasoned that Ford could not exercise
"discretion" in the installation of safety devices in jeeps it
produced.' 21 The omission of seat belts had been intention-
ally imposed by the specifications of the government through
its contract with Ford. 22 Moreover, the court stated that the
procurement of military equipment was made under the gov-
ernment's war powers and its "inherent right and obligation
to maintain an adequate defense posture."'123 If liability were
imposed on a government contractor which had strictly com-
plied with plans provided by the Army, the court reasoned,
the government's ability to "formulate policy and make judg-
ments pursuant to its war powers" 124 would be seriously im-
paired. 25 The court likewise noted that the government, not
Ford, is vested with "the responsibility of deciding the nature
and type of military equipment which best suits its needs.'
26
1" Sanner, 364 A.2d at 44. The plaintiff was apparently not a member of the armed
forces. See Sanner, 364 A.2d at 44. Nevertheless, the Government had immunity in this
case under the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. See
Sanner, 381 A.2d at 806. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1976) (retaining immunity for
"claims arising out of the combatant activities of the [Armed Forces] during time of
war") with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) (retaining immunity for claims based on a gov-
ernment employee's performance or failure to perform a discretionary function).
,,- Sanner, 364 A.2d at 44.
q,9 Id at 44-45.
1- Id at 45-46.
,, Id at 47.
M Id at 45-46.
123 Id. at 47.
124 Id
126 Id The issue of judicial intrusion into military decisions appears to have been
treated uniformly by the courts in whatever context it has appeared. For example, the
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A more recent treatment of the government contractor de-
fense in a military context was set out in In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litzgation. 27 In order to better focus the issues
in this complex litigation, the federal district court hearing
the case had ordered the parties to submit briefs setting forth
their positions as to the elements of the government contrac-
tor defense.1 28  The plaintiffs made the novel argument that
the government contractor defense was not available when
the contractor had any role, either directly or indirectly, in
preparing the specifications for "Agent Orange,"'' 29 and when
the government lacked knowledge or expertise of the hazards
of "Agent Orange" commensurate with that of the manufac-
United States Supreme Court refused on constitutional grounds to allow judicial re-
view by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and orders of the National Guard
following the Kent State riots in 1970. The Court reasoned that these areas "embrace
critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches of the Government." Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7 (1972). The
Ninth Circuit characterized the review of military decisions as to whether a draftee was
a conscientious objector as "the narrowest known to law." Morrison v. Larsen, 446
F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1971). Another court expressed strong reservations about sec-
ond-guessing military procurement practices that were allegedly anti-competitive even
in light of a Congressional mandate to the Armed Forces to provide the maximum
extent of competition in its purchases. Aero Corp. v. Department of the Navy, 493 F.
Supp. 557, 568 (D.D.C. 1981). The "Agent Orange" court expressed its position on
this question as it relates to a products liability case, saying:
Courts should not require suppliers of ordnance to question the mili-
tary's needs or specifications for weapons during wartime. Whether to
use a particular weapon that creates a risk to third parties, whether the
risk could be avoided at additional cost, whether the weapon could be
made safer if a longer manufacturing time were allowed, indeed,
whether the weapon involves any risk at all, are all proper concerns of
the military which selects, buys and uses the weapon. But they are not
sources of liability which should be thrust upon a supplier, nor are they
decisions that are properly made by a court.
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). See it/a notes 128-139 and accompanying text.
127 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The litigation involved claims of 2.4 million
servicemen for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to the contaminated defoliant
"Agent Orange" in Vietnam. Note, Tort Remedies for Servicemen Injured by Mi/day Equip-
ment." A Casefor Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 602 (1980). The case had
not yet gone to trial when the McKay decision was handed down. McKay v. Rockwell,
704 F.2d 444, 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
' "Agent Orange'" 534 F. Supp. at 1053.
Id at 1054. "Agent Orange" is the term used by the court to collectively refer to
a variety of herbicides including Agents Orange, Pink, Purple, and Green. In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 786 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
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turer.130 The defendants contended, on the other hand, that
the defense should be available if the United States estab-
lished specifications for "Agent Orange" and those specifica-
tions were met. 3  The court rejected each party's
formulation of the defense. 132
Instead, the district court ruled that the defense would
shield the defendant contractor from liability were it to prove
the following: first, that the government established the spec-
ifications1 33 for "Agent Orange"; second, that the defendants
manufactured the "Agent Orange" in accordance with the
government's specifications in all material respects;134 and
third, that the government knew at least as much as the de-
fendants about the hazards of "Agent Orange."'' 35 In formu-
lating its standard, the court stated that it was compelled by
public policy to add as a requisite of the defense that a con-
tractor inform the military of the known risks of a particular
weapon in order to prevent insulating a contractor from lia-
bility for harm which would never have occurred if the mili-
tary had been informed of the hazards known to the
contractor. 36 In addition, the court noted that the defense
was premised on the inherent unfairness of imposing liability
upon a contractor merely supplying the government with the
material that it required.' 37 Hence, the court stated that the
defendant must also prove that the product was in fact a
product for which the government established specific char-
acteristics and that the government directives were not
merely general specifications for gauging manufacturer
"Agent Orange'" 534 F. Supp. at 1054.
Id
'3 Id at 1055.
': The court distinquished a contract that "set forth merely a 'performance specifi-
cation' " from one which set forth a "specified product." It said that the defense would
be far more restricted in the former case rather than the latter, implying that relative
degrees of specificity in contracts could affect the degree to which a defendant was
sheilded from immunity. Id at 1056.
':1" Id at 1055. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
cases involving manufacturing defects and design defects).
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performance. 138
C. Strict Products Liabi'ty as Applied to the Government
Contractor
Strict products liability arose because of the inadequacies
of the remedies historically available to the consumer harmed
by a defective product. 139  Its theoretical justifications, like-
wise, have been grounded in reference to the protection of the
consumer. 4 ° Yet the theory has been advanced in cases in-
fRId
Compare Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1114-34 (1960) (advocating the adoption of strict products liability by point-
ing out the difficulties with recovery under negligence and warranty) with Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strit Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 799-800 (1966)
(predicating the "explosion" of strict products liability upon the public interest in the
maximum protection for the consumer). Prior to products liability, negligence and
warranty theories provided, for most items, a plaintiff's only possible means of redress.
Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-
14 (1960). Negligence proved to be unsatisfactory in compensating for harm by prod-
ucts because of the difficulties in actually proving negligence on the part of one of
several independent entities in the modern manufacturing and distribution systems. Id
at 1116-17. Warranty theory, on the other hand, became recognized more often as a
deterrent to establishing liability rather than an aid. Id at 1127-28. Privity of contract
under the common law was a predicate for recovery on a warranty, limiting those who
could recover under this theory to the parties to the sale. Id. at 1128-29. Furthermore,
the seller traditionally could disclaim any warranty, thus limiting his liability or even
the buyer's remedies if liability were established. Id at 1131-32.
,40 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962), Justice Traynor became the first to establish strict liability in tort without
regard to negligence or warranty. Traynor stated that the purpose of strict liability
was to insure that the costs of harm caused by defective products are borne by the
manufacturers who placed the products on the market rather than by the injured per-
son. 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. In his concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944), Traynor had previ-
ously reasoned that the manufacturer should bear the burden of loss from defective
products because it can best insure against such loss and distribute the cost of such
losses among the public as a cost of doing business. This justification for strict liability
was recognized as the enterprise liability theory in Wights v. Staff'Jennings, Inc., 241
Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624, 627-28 (1965).
Since Greenman and the inclusion of section 402A in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, courts and legal scholars have identified at least four principles underlying strict
products liability. Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict Liabiity for Commer-
cial Sellers Desireable?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 535, 537 (1981). The first is enterprise liability.
Id Under this theory, losses to society created or caused by an enterprise should be
borne by that enterprise. Id Once strict liability is imposed, the product's price would
reflect the costs of all harm resulting from defects in the product. Id If the product's
price fully reflects all the costs which that product imposes on society, the laws of
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volving military as well as consumer products.'41 The Eighth
Circuit considered the applicability of the principles support-
ing products liability in cases involving military equipment in
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. 142 The plaintiff, seriously in-
jured when a hand grenade exploded in his hand during mili-
tary training, filed suit against both the manufacturer of the
fuse in the grenade and the assembler of the grenade. 143 The
plaintiff prevailed in federal district court against both de-
fendants on a strict products liability theory 4 4 for manufac-
turing defects in the grenade. 145
On appeal the defendants contended that the application
supply and demand will effect a more efficient allocation of resources. Id at 537. A
second justification is market deterrence. Id Strict liability imposes costs upon produ-
cers to encourage the elimination of product defects. Id. Because the costs of injuries
will be taken from the profits of manufacturing, producers have an incentive to supply
safer products. Id at 539. Compensation is another basis for strict liability. Id While
the cost of an injury may be overwhelming to the injured person, the manufacturer can
insure against the risk of injury and distribute this cost to the consuming public. Id at
543. Finally, implied representation is considered a part of the rationale behind prod-
ucts liabilty. Id. By offering to sell a product, a manufacturer impliedly represents that
the product is not unreasonably dangerous. Id. If the product is defective, strict liabil-
ity compensates for the lost expectations of the consumer. Id at 544 & n.42.
1- The most recent assertion of the government contractor defense in a case involv-
ing a military product was in In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany, on
September 11, 1982, 575 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (ordering, among other things,
the application of Pennsylvania law to all cases on the issue of liability in response to
pretrial motion). The case arose following the crash of an Army CH-47 Chinook heli-
copter carrying several members of the French national skydiving team. The crash
was caused by design defects in one of the helicopter's rotor transmissions. NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 12, 1983 at 3, col. 2. At the close of the trial, the trial judge apparently charged
the jury that it could find liability if it found that the manufacturer of the helicopter,
the Boeing Company, had final control over the design. Id Presented only with the
question of liability, the jury found for the plaintiffs and against Boeing. Id
142 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
4 Id at 869. The Day and Zimmerman Company assembled the grenade. The
Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Company, also a defendant, manufactured the fuse.
Id
I144 I
145 Id. at 873-74 & n.5. The Court of Appeals distinguished strict liability claims
against the manufacturer of a product which did meet the contract specifications and a
product which did not meet all requirements. It stated: "The doctrine of strict liabil-
ity is not a doctrine of liability without fault. It merely removes the necessity for prov-
ing negligence." Id. at 874. "The government's specifications did not call for the
defendant to assemble a defectively made grenade." Id at 874 n.5. "The doctrine of
sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover thefault of a private corporation, no
matter how intimate its connection with the government." Id at 874 (emphasis ad-
ded). See supra note 101.
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of strict products liability was not proper under the facts of
the case. t46 They argued that the public interest in discour-
aging the entry of defective products into the stream of com-
merce 47 was not implicated in this case.48 because the fuse
and grenade were manufactured exclusively for the govern-
ment and were never placed in the stream of commerce.
149
The court reasoned otherwise.' 50 It first pointed out that
strict liability had been adopted primarily because of the
"justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and
reaping'the profit."' 5' The court concluded that the public
interest in protecting human life required that the law pro-
tect against defective explosives whether they were used by
the public or by those in the armed forces.' 5 2 The court con-
sidered the fact that the defendants profited from its sales of
military equipment more persuasive than the fact that they
did not solicit the public to use their product. 5
3
The application of products liability to sales of military
equipment was taken a step further in Challoner v. Day &Zim-
merman, Inc.'54 The plaintiff in Challoner was injured by the
premature explosion of an artillery shell in Cambodia during
the Vietnam conflict.' 55 The trial court allowed recovery
under strict liability principles. 56 Before the Fifth Circuit,
the defendants objected to an instruction indicating that the
,46 Id at 871.
,41 See generally Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (abandoning privity of contract and imposing strict liability under a warranty
theory for products entering the stream of commerce).
14a Foster, 502 F.2d at 871.
149 Id.
- Id at 871-72.
1 Id at 871 (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965)).
,.2 Foster, 502 F.2d at 871.
1,-3 Id In answer to the defendant's arguments, the court stated that "the defendants
here did not solicit the use of their product, yet they most certainly did reap the profits
from its production." Id See supra note 141 for a discussion of enterprise liability.
154 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
' Challoner, 512 F.2d at 78.
' Id The court of appeals agreed with the district judge that Texas choice-of-law
rules should not apply although Texas was the place of the forum. Id at 82. The
Supreme Court held that Texas choice-of-law rules should apply. Challoner, 423 U.S. at
4-5.
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jury should have found the defendant liable if it found that
the shell was defectively designed.' 57 The design of the shell
was exclusively controlled by the government;15 thus, the de-
fendants maintained that the instruction was erroneous.
159
The court held, however, that strict liability does not require
a manufacturer's act to be the cause of the defect. Rather,
the court thought the manufacturer should be liable if the
product was defective when it left the manufacturer's con-
trol.' 60 As in Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, the Fifth Circuit like-
wise was persuaded that enterprise liability 16 1 justified the
157 Challoner, 512 F.2d at 82.
,8 Id at 79. An agent of Day and Zimmerman testified that the ammunition was
made precisely according to government design and that a government-approved in-
spection had been followed as well. Id.
- Id. at 82. One of the cases cited by the defendant was Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan
Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924). See supra note 87. The defense recognized
in Ryan, which is similar to the government contractor defense, was held to be limited
to claims grounded in negligence. Challoner, 512 F.2d at 83.
' Id The court relied upon cases applying strict liability to those other than the
manufacturer who were in the chain of distribution. Eg., McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
416 S.W. 2d 787, 790 n.3 (Tex. 1967). One of the first cases to apply strict liability in
such a manner was Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). The court in this case said: "[Sitrict liability on the manufac-
turer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works
no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between
them in the course of their continuing business relationship." 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 900.
,6, See supra note 141. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt strict
products liability solely on the theory of enterprise liability. It held:
The rationale of risk spreading and compensating the victim has no spe-
cial relevancy to cases involving injuries resulting from the use of defec-
tive goods. The reasoning would seem to apply not only in cases
involving personal injuries arising from the sale of defective goods, but
equally to any case where an injury results from the risk creating con-
duct of the seller in any stage of the production and distribution of
goods. Thus a manufacturer would be strictly liable even in the absence
of fault for an injury to a person struck by one of the manufacturer's
trucks being used in transporting his goods to market. It seems to us that
the enterprise liability rationale employed in the Escola [sic] case proves
too much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the principle of
strict liability in all future cases where the loss could be distributed.
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624, 628 (1965) (emphasis in
original). The causation problems associated with enterprise liability as illustrated in
W4 ghts were also noted in Klemme, The Enterpnse Liabilty Theog of Torts, 47 U. COLO.
L. REV. 153 (1976). The author of this article stated that the problem encountered
under enterprise liability was that no compensable tort loss is ever the result of only
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imposition of strict liability. 162
Other courts, however, have not been so eager to apply
strict liability to products supplied pursuant to government
contractual specifications. In Liltlehale v. El du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 163 the theory was examined in a suit arising
from the premature explosion of a blasting cap manufac-
turered by Du Pont for the War Department.' 64  The plain-
tiffs in Littlehale brought an action under a theory of strict
products liability against Du Pont for failure to warn of the
dangers of the caps. 165 Ruling in favor of Du Pont on a mo-
tion for summary judgement, the federal district court found
that Du Pont had complied with all applicable government
specifications 66 but grounded its decision upon the fact that
Du Pont owed no duty to warn the plaintiffs of the dan-
gers. 67 The court went on, however, to distinguish the facts
of this case from the "typical" products liability case 168
where the manufacturer exercises sole discretion over the
method of manufacture as well as all other details involved in
production.' 69 The court recognized that a defense to strict
liability existed for an independent contractor 70 directed to
one enterprise. The author pointed out that the theory of enterprise liability does not
provide a "rational answer" to which enterprise caused the loss. Id at 162.
,f See Challoner, 512 F.2d at 84. In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence pertain-
ing to the shell's defects, the court in Challoner only mentioned manufacturing defects.
See Challoner, 512 F.2d at 83. The omission of any mention of design defects has lead
one court to state that the true holding in Challoner may have been limited to manufac-
turing defects. See Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y. Supp. 2d
400, 402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
63 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aj'd, 380 F.2d 274 (3rd Cir. 1967).
6 Id at 793.
69 Id. at 793, 798.
"" Id at 795.
d' id at 801.
' "Failure to warn" was recognized as sounding in tort in the law of strict products
liability. Id at 797. See Hunt v. Balsius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1977)
(noting that Lilehale was decided as a strict liability case although not expressly stated
as such in the opinion), aft, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1979).
,69 Litlehal, 268 F. Supp. 802-3 n.16.
,10 Although Litllehale involved a suit against a contractor of the United States, the
court spoke of the contract specification defense that was recognized in Ryan v. Feney &
Sheehan Bldg. Co. as available to independent contractors. Litlehal, 268 F. Supp. at
802-04 nn.16-17; see supra note 87. Plaintiff Littlehale was a civilian employed by the
Navy in connection with certain tests being conducted aboard a Navy ship. Plaintiff
Zelanko, a seaman, was a mere bystander. Littlehal, 268 F. Supp. at 793. Although
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comply with contract specifications where those specifications
were actually satisfied.'' The court explained that under
this defense, liability, if it does exist, remains with the party
whose plans were followed. 7
2
Although the court found there was no liability without
resorting to any defenses to strict liability, 7 3 it elaborated
upon the nature of the case before it and the law applicable
thereto. The court said:
[The case presented] is not a case involving a product manu-
factured for sale or resale to the general public. It is not a
case involving negligence in the manufacture, design or use of
materials. It is not a case where the manufacturer had any
freedom of choice as to manufacture, design or use of materi-
als . . . . It is a case where the product was manufactured
during wartime in accordance with detailed specifications for
1 74use by a particular branch of the Government ....
the issue was not raised, it is arguable in light of the court's analysis that the United
States would not have been immune from liability to one or both plaintiffs under the
FTCA; therefore, Du Pont should not have been immune under the traditional gov-
ernment contractor defense. See Littlehale 268 F. Supp. at 802-04 nn. 16-17.
,7, Lt'ttlehale, 268 F. Supp. at 803 n. 16. The court considered this defense applicable
to strict products liability in light of the fact that the contract requirements were fol-
lowed in a proper manner. Id The court distinguished Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 221 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), where contract specifications were
followed in a negligent manner. Lilehale, 268 F. Supp. at 803 n.16.
72 Id
,73 Id at 804 n.17.
,14 Id at 801-03 (footnotes omitted). See also Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F.
Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Kropp involved a claim of negligence in the design of an
aircraft manufactured by Douglas for the Navy. Id. at 450. The court characterized
the process of designing a military aircraft by stating:
The dealings between the appropriate agency of the Government and
the designer and manufacturer of the plane can be analogized to the
person who orders a tailor-made suit and the tailor. The designing of a
combat plane is a lengthy process covering approximately five years
from the concept of the plane to its manufacture for production and use
[citation omitted]. The design of such a plane begins rather informally
with an idea or suggestion which may emanate either from the manufac-
turer or the Government - usually the latter. The gamut of plane de-
sign and construction runs from idea to design to mock-up to prototype
to test work and culminates in a production craft. Along this road,
many modifications and changes are suggested and considered; some
are accepted; some are rejected. But there comes a time when the design
is "frozen" and production begins. The order to freeze the design, in the
instant case, was that of the Chief of Naval Operations.
d at 456. The economics of military procurement are also much different than those
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In summation, the court expressed its opinion that a party
acting in accordance with plans provided in a contract with
the government is at the very least not judged by the same
standards as an ordinary manufacturer and at the most is in-
sulated from any liability.
7 5
The reasoning in Litlehale was adopted in Hunt v. Blase'us.'76
The "product" in Hunt was a sign pole erected on an inter-
state highway by the defendant according to the design fur-
nished by the State of Illinois.'77 The plaintiffs were the
occupants and the survivors of the deceased occupants of a
car which had crashed into the pole.'78 They claimed under
a theory of products liability that anchoring the pole with
solid steel and concrete within three feet of the highway was
unreasonably dangerous. 7 9 The trial court granted a motion
for summary judgment in favor of the defendants.180 The Il-
linois Court of Appeals affirmed trial court's decision. 8" The
appellate court agreed with the idea of testing a manufac-
turer acting under the plans and specifications of another by
a different standard than that of an ordinary manufacturer
acting under his own discretion. 8 2 The court denied liability
even though all persons in the chain of distribution are liable
regardless of fault under Illinois law.' 83 The court stated that
the policy behind products liability was formulated in refer-
ence to products manufactured and sold for use by the
general public, not for use by a government entity which had
products manufactured in accordance with its
prevailing in the private sector. See Economics of Defense Polcy. Adm. H G Rickover, Hear-
ing before theJoint Economic Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 16, 22 (1983).
17r. LitIlehale, 268 F. Supp. at 804 n.17.
17,; 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aft'd, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368
(1978).
, 370 N.E.2d at 618.
17. Id.
171 Id. It was undisputed by all of the parties, however, that the sign was manufac-
tured and installed in accordance with the plans. The plaintiffs' theories of recovery
included strict liability for the defective design of the pole. Id
, Id
""Id
182 Id at 62 1.
8. Id
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specifications. 84
The court also pointed out that government contracts are
different in their essence from private undertakings. Govern-
ment contracts are let through open bidding in order to pre-
serve tax revenues.185 If liability were imposed, the court
determined, bids would simply be raised to offset potential
liability.' 86 The Illinois court, therefore, concluded that
"public policy dictates that bidders who comply with govern-
ment specifications should be shielded from liability in any
respect in which the product complies.'
187
II. MCKAY V ROCKWELL INT'L CORP.
Until McKay came before the Ninth Circuit, an appellate
court had never squarely considered whether the government
contractor defense was applicable to products liability claims
involving design defects in military equipment. 18 8 The court,
therefore, commenced its analysis of the controlling law with
the Feres-Stencel doctrine.' 9 It reiterated that the priniciples
underlying this doctrine shielded the United States from di-
rect tort liability and similarly precluded indemnification of a
manufacturer for damages that it incurred. 9 °
Consequently, the question posed by the court was whether
a supplier of military equipment should be required to bear
the "entire burden of the liability to an injured service-
man."'' The court recognized that the government contrac-
'- Id The case cited for the policy behind strict products liability and distinguished
in this design defect case is Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965).. Suvada is the authority relied upon in Foster v. Day & Zimmerman in applying
strict liability in a government contract context for manufacturing defects. See supra
text accompanying note 152.
370 N.E.2d at 621.
"'Id
,87 Id But see Comment, The Government Contract Defense in Strict Liabiliy Suits for Defec-
tive Design, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 1030 (1981) (concluding that the defense should not
apply in strict liability cases where the contractor did not act under compulsion).
,o See NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 3, col. 2 (noting the "dearth of detailed appellate
considerations of the defense" in the context of military products).
See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
McKay v. Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 448.
'"' Id. This question was addressed in Finn & Martin, Strict Liabiity in Military Avia-
tion Cases--Should it Apply?, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 347, 351 (1983). The authors there
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tor defense had emerged to protect a contractor in
compliance with government specifications from liability
where the government was immune from liability.'9 2 More-
over, the court found the reasons for applying the defense to
suppliers of military equipment whose design was approved
by the government parallel the principles underlying the
Feres-Stencel doctrine. ,
93
The fact that the United States is not liable to servicemen,
either directly or indirectly, under Sencel,9 4 received primary
emphasis.' 95 The court reasoned that holding a government
contractor liable, without regard to the extent of the govern-
ment's involvement in the product's design, would indirectly
expose the government to liability.'96 This liability would
arise, the court said, because contractors would pass on the
costs of accidents through cost overrun provisions in con-
tracts, add the price of liability insurance' 97 to their contracts,
or simply charge higher prices in later equipment sales.'9 8
The court also applied the rationale of Stencel to conclude
that holding military contractors liable for those design de-
fects which were approved by the government would "thrust
the judiciary into the making of military decisions."' 9 9 It
viewed the questioning of military actions and decisions and
its deleterious effects on military discipline with the same dis-
were apparently being published as the opinion in McKay was handed down. Never-
theless, both were in agreement that the policies behind strict liability do not justify its
extension to manufacturers of military aircraft in design defect cases. See McKay v.
Rockwell, 704 F.2d at 451-53; Finn & Martin, Strict Liability in Miitay Aviation Cases-
Should It Apply?, 48 J. AIR. L. & COM. 347, 349-58 (1983).
, 704 F.2d at 448.
,9 Id at 449.
, See supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
704 F.2d at 449.
SId
'"' See Note, supra note 141, at 543 n.39 (stating that products liability insurance is
often unavailable or unaffordable in a number of industries).
-g 704 F.2d at 449. The court quoted from Stencel, saying that liability on behalf of
government contractors would "judicially admit at the back door that which has been
legislatively been turned away at the front door. We do not believe that the [Federal
Tort Claims] Act permits such a result." Id (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673); see supra
text accompanying note 70.
- 704 F.2d at 449.
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pleasure as the Supreme Court in Sencel 2°  In addition, the
court noted that national security could be compromised by
judicial intrusion into the military decision-making process
and that separation of powers could become a concern if the
judiciary sought review of the military decisions
themselves.2"'
The court, however, considered two significant factors,
which were not addressed in Feres or Sencel, in its decision as
to the applicability of the government contractor defense.
First, in setting specifications for military equipment, the
Government attempts to push technology to its limits and in-
curs risks far beyond those found in consumer goods.2" 2 The
court added that manufacturers supplying military equip-
ment are often unable to negotiate the reduction of those
risks.2°3 Second, the government contractor defense provides
incentives for suppliers to work closely with military authori-
ties to fix precisely the responsibility for military equipment
design.20 4 As the court explained, the defense is inapplicable
where only very general requirements are set out in the
contract.205
The court held, therefore, that the government contractor
defense applied to military products2 0 6 where, first, the gov-
-' Id; see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
-" 704 F.2d at 449. See supra note 127 for a treatment of the authority relied upon
by the McKay court in reaching this conclusion.
2- 704 F.2d at 450. See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp.
447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The defendants in Montgomery argued that in order to keep ahead
in the armaments race, sacrifice must be made on some elements of safety. The court
said, "we recognize that in some cases, certain safety factors must be disregarded in
order to explore new possibilities in weaponry. Similarly, it may be true that complete
knowledge of all possible safety problems cannot be obtained because of the speed with
which these weapons must be completed." Id at 450.
- 704 F.2d at 450 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506
F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981)).
704 F.2d at 450.
, Id See infra text accompanying notes 211-213. Cf Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982) (an example of the difficulties in tracing responsibility
for defects in military equipment).
- 704 F.2d at 451.
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ernment was immune from liability207 and, second, the sup-
plier proved that the United States established or approved 211
"reasonably precise specifications" for the equipment. 20 9 The
court distinguished the facts in Merritt21 ° and its language in-
dicating that "compulsion" was an element of the defense. 11
The court determined that the contract in Merrit left to the
discretion of the contractor the design, materials, and method
of construction of the injury-causing "product.1 21 2 The court
stated that the situation was different where, as in the present
case, the United States reviewed and approved a detailed set
of specifications.21 3
A third prong of the court's holding required that, in order
for the defense to be applicable, the equipment supplied must
conform to government specifications. 2 4 Thus, the court did
not shield suppliers of military equipment from liability for
manufacturing defects. The court reasoned that such a rule
would furnish an incentive to manufacturers to use all means
to provide equipment in conformance with government spec-
ifications. 2 " As a fourth requirement, the court added that
the defense would only be available where the supplier
warned the government about patent errors in the govern-
ment's specifications or about dangers involved in the use of
the equipment which were known to the supplier but not the
government.21 6
The court held that when these four requirments were met,
the government contractor defense would bar an action in
2, A predicate to the government contractor defense recognized since Yearsley is the
immunity of the government. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
-" The HS-lA was actually designed under contract by Rockwell but approved by
the Navy. See Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee at 13-14, McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983); Answering and Reply Brief of Plain-
tiffs/Appellants at 2-6, McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
-9 704 F.2d at 451.
210 See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
- 704 F.2d at 450.
-'2 Id
21:1 Id
21 Id at 451. See supra note 101; supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
704 F.2d at 451.
I1 d
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strict liability.2 17 The court reasoned that when these circum-
stances were present, the policy considerations behind strict
liability in tort were inapposite. 218 The court supported its
position by analyzing and distinguishing each policy justify-
ing relief under the theory. 9
Enterprise liability, according to the court, rests upon two
assumptions: that consumers underestimate the risks involved
in a product's use, thereby overconsuming the product unless
the price reflects the cost of all the harm it produces; and that
demand for a product is elastic.220 The court determined that
neither of these assumptions applied in sales of military
equipment to the govenment. 22  The court recognized that
those in the armed forces are well aware of the risks involved
with military equipment.222 The court also noted that de-
mand for military equipment is not elastic- government
purchases of military equipment are determined by military
and political strategy, not sales price.223 The court con-
cluded: "[m]eeting adequately the needs of national defense,
not accident costs, is the ultimate standard by which
purchases of military equipment must be measured. 2 4
The court also held that the market deterrence rationale
for strict products liability was not applicable to defective
products supplied to servicemen.225 It relied upon the fact
that the government, whose demand is inelastic, is the sole
purchaser of military equipment. 226 The imposition of strict
liability, according to the court, would not encourage safety
features but only increase defense costs since the government
negotiates directly for the specifications of all equipment it
," Id. Cf supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text.
218 704 F.2d at 451.
2,9 Id at 451-53. See supra note 141.
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purchases.2 7
The court found the compensation principles underlying
strict liability to be equally unpersuasive.2 8 It quoted from
Slencel that servicemen were provided "a generous military
compensation scheme," and "a swift, efficient remedy.
229
The court thought it of controlling significance that the ser-
viceman or his dependents would "not go uncompensated"
whereas an ordinary consumer would.3 °
Finally, the court disposed of the implied representation
justification. 31 It distinguished the members of the armed
forces from ordinary consumers because of the servicemen's
lower expectations of safety.232 The court pointed out that, in
fact, grave risks were a part of being in the service. 33 More-
over, the court further differentiated servicemen from con-
sumers by lauding their position in society. 234 It stated: "to
regard them as ordinary consumers would demean and dis-
honor the high station in public esteem to which, because of
their exposure to danger, they are justly entitled. '235
The dissent, however, disagreed in principle with the ma-
jority's opinion. 3 6 It first objected to the extension of the
governmental immunity recognized 237 under the Feres-Stencel
doctrine to private contractors. The dissent pointed out that
227 Id. The court also pointed out that a possible effect of increased defense costs
would be a reduction in other expenditures. Id
,2 704 F.2d at 452.
129 Id See supra note 68.
":- 704 F.2d at 452.
2:11 See supra note 141.
2:12 704 F.2d at 453.
23 Id.
2:14 Id
--r, Id The commentators have also recognized the inapplicability of the theory of
implied representation to the sale of military equipment without relying upon the
same reasoning as the McKay court. See Finn & Martin, supra note 192, at 354. Implied
representation rests upon the representation of safety that is implied from an offer to
sell a product. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. The commentators
suggest that the government does not rely soley on the manufacturer's representations
of safety when purchasing military aircraft but is involved in the design process and
fully tests prototypes before purchasing any aircraft. See Finn & Martin, supra note
192, at 354.
2:,, 704 F.2d at 456-64.
2:17 Id at 456.
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neither opinion addressed nor precluded contractor liability
to military personnel.23 It called attention to the fact that
the Supreme Court, in a footnote to Stencel, had indicated
that prohibiting indemnification by the government to a pri-
vate contractor was not unfair because the contractor already
had notice as to the risk of liability from defective products
prior to any negotiations with the government. 39 Further-
more, the dissent was not persuaded that contractors held lia-
ble for unsafe designs would begin passing the liability costs
on to the government. 4 ° The dissent determined that the
competiton in the process of bidding for government con-
tracts would prevent those contractors who had suffered lia-
bility in the past from passing those costs on to the
government. 241
Second, the dissent took exception to the majority's formu-
lation of the government contractor defense. 42 The dissent
argued that the immunity of the government should be ex-
tended only when the contractor was compelled to comply
with government specifications.243 It read the previous cases
extending immunity to the manufacturer of military goods as
2M Id.
239 Id at 457. Cf. supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
2- 704 F.2d at 457.
21, Id. at 457-58. The dissent grounded its position in the existence of a free market
economy which would ensure that the transfer of liability costs from a contractor to the
government would be minimized. Id Admiral H.G. Rickover, however, has suggested
that the economic assumptions of the dissenting judge may not reflect reality. The
Admiral stated:
Competition in defense procurement is often more illusory than real.
While 35 percent of the defense procurement budget is spent under con-
tracts the Defense Department considers competitive, only about 8 per-
cent is spent on formally advertised procurements - that is where any
company may submit a bid and the contract must be awarded to the
lowest responsive and responsible bidder. In some competitive procure-
ments only two or three firms are asked to bid. In other so-called com-
petitive procurements the competition is not based on price, but on
design or other technical factors. Sixty-five percent of the defense pro-
curement budget is awarded in contracts which the Defense Department
itself labels as non-competitive.
Economis of Defense Po'y." Adm. H G Rickover, Hearn g before the Jont Economz Commitee,
97TH CONG., 2D SESS., pt. 2 at 22 (1982)).
212 704 F.2d at 458.
I2 d at 458-60.
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limited to sales made during the time of war when the con-
tractors had no discretion but to produce those goods accord-
ing to specifications provided by the military.244 The dissent
concluded that the majority had gone "too far" in granting
immunity.245
III. CONCLUSION
The McKqy decision has not only clarified the status of the
government contractor defense, but it has established a prac-
tical rule of law that should endure as long as private compa-
nies provide the machinery of war to a sovereign immune
from tort liability. The magnitude of potential liability from
the sale of equipment designed, produced, and employed
with the ultimate objective of destruction is immense. Con-
gress has chosen to limit the government's liability through
the exceptions to the FTCA.246 McKay, at last, clearly pro-
vides reciprocal treatment to the manufacturers of military
equipment whose contractual relations with the government
may now be predicated upon a sound legal basis. McKay has
also recognized that the practical and constitutional limita-
tions of the judiciary support the government contractor de-
fense when applied to military products.2 47 Military
decisions concerning the acceptability of risks in weapons, es-
pecially sophisticated weapons, are not compatible with judi-
cial review. Those decisions are influenced heavily by
political, technical, and economic considerations that are
properly within the domain of the executive branch.248
2.4 Id. at 458-59. See supra notes 108-139 and accompanying text.
24, 704 F.2d at 458.
246 See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
24 Justice Blackmun has noted the limited nature of judicial review on military
matters in a case involving the judicial review of national guard orders and use of force
during a riot. He stated:
This case relates to prospective relief in the form of judicial surveillance
of highly subjective and technical matters involving military training
and command. As such, it presents an '[inappropriate]. . .subject mat-
ter for judicial consideration,' for respondents are asking the District
Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, 'to enter upon policy deter-
minations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.'
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In short, McKay has redefined the government contractor
defense as it applies in the sale of military products. To the
extent that the previous Ninth Circuit decision in Merritt rec-
ognized "compulsion" as an element of the defense, it has
been overruled.2 49 Now "reasonably precise specifications"
are the standard. Requiring only that the contractor prove
that such specifications were approved by the government is
consistent with the process of negotiations between contrac-
tors and government representatives from which the details of
a particular weapon finally emerge.25 0 Furthermore, contrac-
tors are now free to initiate new applications of the most ad-
vanced technology, assuring availability of the sophisticated
weapons that are so vital to the maintenance of this nation's
military stature. In addition, the relative knowledge of the
dangers of military equipment on behalf of the contractor
and the government as an element of the defense 251 adds a
dimension of fairness especially germane to modern sophisti-
cated weaponry, but not present in the bald sharing of immu-
nity traditionally associated with the defense. Both military
personnel, whose very lives may depend upon a weapon's de-
sign, and the nation as a whole stand to benefit from the re-
sulting incentive for contractors and the military to work
closely together and the consequent fact that the military will
be provided with the information necessary to balance a
weapon's risks and benefits.
252
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 226 (1962)).
2, See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
210 See Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellee at 11-13, McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting from the testimony of a former manager
at Rockwell who stated that the government's involvement in the design process was
"enormous"). See also supra note 175.
25 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
2 See In re 'Agent Orange" Product Liabih'ty Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
The dissent in McKay maintained that the immunity of the government should be
extended to a contractor only when the contractor was compelled to comply with gov-
ernment specifications. See supra notes 237-246 and accompanying text. The dissent
seemed to predicate its formulation of the government contractor defense on the as-
sumption that without potential liability in the contractor, safety in the design of mili-
tary equipment could not be assured. See 708 F.2d at 457-59. One recent student
author echoed this thought when she observed that "[a]lthough the government is usu-
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The government contractor defense is especially appropri-
ate to strict products liability claims of design defects in mili-
tary equipment. Products liability arose because of the lack
of remedies available to the average consumer harmed by a
defective product.253 The justifications for the theory likewise
are derived in reference to the protection of the consumer.
25 4
These principles are foreign to the realities that prevail in the
design, sale, and use of military equipment. The only deci-
sions allowing recovery in strict liability for defects in mili-
tary equipment did so under the theory of enterprise
liability.255 Yet sole reliance on this justification would, ac-
cording to one court, favor imposing liability for harm even
remotely caused by a product. 256 The holding in McKay,
therefore, properly allows recovery under strict liability in
those situations where the government approved only general
specifications or where reasonably precise specifications were
not met.2 5 7 Only in those instances are the principles behind
strict liability apposite.
McKay, however, may be less than satisfying in one re-
spect- it fails to compensate the survivors of military person-
nel as fully as civilians would have been compensated in a
similar disaster. But Congress has chosen to limit the govern-
ment's liability to military personnel through the FTCA25
8
and the Veterans Benefit Act. 25 9 Any remedy, then, for the
one shortcoming in McKay lies not with the judiciary, whose
only recourse would be to place the full brunt of liability on
contractors, but with the legislature, which has the power to
place liability with responsibility. It is this body, not the
ally in the best position to minimize the risk of defective design specifications, sovereign
immunity reduces its incentives to calculate the costs of the risks it creates." Comment,
supra note 188, at 1048-49 (footnotes omitted). In support of their position, however,
both failed to cite any concrete evidence which would indicate that the military does
not seek to preserve the safety of its personnel when making design decisions. See gener-
ally 704 F.2d at 456-62; Comment, supra note 128, at 1048-49.
2.51 See supra note 140.
254 See supra note 141.
255 See supra notes 143-163 and accompanying text.
2- See supra note 162.
2.7 See supra text accompanying notes 210-216.
258 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
25q See supra note 68.
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courts, to which an appeal on this issue must be made. Mc-
Kay simply offers the best available alternative within the
present statutory scheme.
Roger D. Rowe

